G.R. No. L-35173 February 28, 1973
ANASTACIA GALLARDO-ABELEDA, as ADMINISTRATRIX of the Estate of MAGDALENA F. GALLARDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE of BAGUIO and BENGUET, LUCIO GALLARDO and MARIANITA GALLARDO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Anastacia Gallardo-Abeleda was appointed Special Administratrix of the intestate estate of Magdalena F. Gallardo by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The Letters of Administration authorized her to take possession of the estate’s property “in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija and Quezon City.” In her capacity, she filed a collection suit in the Baguio City Court against private respondents to recover unpaid rentals for an apartment house owned by the estate located in Baguio City. During trial, after petitioner testified and presented evidence, respondents’ counsel moved to dismiss the complaint verbally. He argued that the specific enumeration of locations in her appointment excluded the Baguio property, thus stripping her of authority to sue for its recovery. The Baguio City Court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
Petitioner appealed to the respondent Court of First Instance, which affirmed the dismissal. It ruled that the specific mention of certain properties in the Letters of Administration implied the exclusion of the Baguio property. The court added that if petitioner believed her appointment was defective, she should have sought its amendment from the probate court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the Special Administratrix lacked the legal capacity to institute the suit for recovery of unpaid rentals on a property of the estate located in Baguio City, based on the wording of her Letters of Administration.

RULING

The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal orders and remanded the case for trial on the merits. The Court clarified that petitioner’s subsequent appointment as the regular administratrix of the entire estate, which occurred during the pendency of the appeal, had removed any doubt regarding her authority to administer the Baguio property and to file the suit on behalf of the estate. This development rendered the technical objection to her capacity moot.
The legal logic proceeds from the nature of a special administrator’s powers under Rule 80, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, which grants the authority to “take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased” and “to commence and maintain suits as administrator.” The Court implied that a restrictive enumeration of locations in the appointment document should not be construed to divest the special administrator of the core duty to preserve all assets of the estate, absent a showing of a conflicting appointment or disqualification. The lower courts erred in granting a dismissal based on a perceived lack of capacity during the trial’s course, especially since the motion was not a demurrer to evidence under Rule 35. A dismissal under Rule 16 on the ground of lack of capacity does not preclude a subsequent filing by a properly authorized party; it does not adjudicate the merits. Therefore, with the capacity issue resolved by her subsequent regular appointment, the estate’s substantive right to pursue the collection action remained. The case was remanded to the city court for the reception of evidence and proper adjudication on the merits.