G.R. No. 34616, December 15, 1930
HERMENEGILDO MAKAPAGAL and MARIA FIGUEROA, petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO SANTAMARIA, Acting Judge of Court of First Instance of Manila, PEDRO DE LA PENA and MARIA DE LA CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Hermenegildo Makapagal and Maria Figueroa filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against respondents Pedro de la Peña and Maria de la Cruz for the custody of Makapagal’s son, Amado. The Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge Francisco Santamaria, decided in favor of the petitioners and ordered the child’s release. However, the same judgment sentenced petitioner Makapagal to pay the costs of the proceedings. The trial court justified this imposition on the ground that Makapagal had “violated the truth” by falsely stating in his sworn petition that the respondents were unlawfully detaining the child. The petitioners, alleging poverty, did not appeal the judgment but instead filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the portion of the judgment ordering them to pay costs, arguing that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court, having decided the habeas corpus petition in favor of the petitioners, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in ordering them to pay the costs of the proceedings.

RULING

Yes, the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and reversed the portion of the judgment sentencing the petitioners to pay costs.

1. On the General Rule for Costs in Habeas Corpus: The general law on costs in ordinary actions, under Section 487 of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides that costs shall ordinarily be allowed to the prevailing party. The court may adjudge costs against the prevailing party only for “special reasons.” The Court found no such special reason existed in this case.

2. No “Special Reason” for Imposing Costs on the Prevailing Party: The trial court’s stated reasonthat Makapagal falsely alleged unlawful detentionwas invalid. The record showed the respondents refused to deliver the child because Makapagal would not reimburse them for the child’s maintenance. Detention based on a debt is unlawful. Therefore, Makapagal’s allegation was truthful, and the trial court had no valid basis to impose costs on him as the prevailing party.

3. Inapplicability of the Pauper Provisions: The trial court also erred in relying on Section 785 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by Act No. 1586), which allows costs to be charged against a party who falsely alleges poverty. The Court found that petitioner Makapagal was indeed a pauper, so this provision did not apply.

4. Propriety of Certiorari: The petitioners’ failure to appeal did not bar this certiorari proceeding. Given their poverty, an appeal (which would require a bond to stay execution) was not the speediest and most adequate remedy to prevent the enforcement of the costs order. Certiorari was therefore appropriate to correct an act in excess of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court held that a court exceeds its jurisdiction when it sentences the prevailing party to pay the costs of an action without a special reason to justify such an order.