GR 34447; (June, 1973) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-34447 June 22, 1973
TEOFILO GUILALA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE’S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, ROSA HIZON and DOMINADOR HIZON, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Teofilo Guilala sought the dismissal of the appeal filed by the People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC) and the Hizons in the Court of Appeals. He argued that the appellants’ record on appeal failed to comply with Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which requires it to contain “such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.” Specifically, Guilala pointed out that while the record on appeal included the notice of appeal (dated March 12, 1971, stating the decision was served on March 10 and an appeal bond filed on March 13) and a motion for its approval (dated March 15, 1971), it did not explicitly state the date when the record on appeal itself was filed with the trial court. He further contended that the record on appeal did not show it had been approved by the lower court. The Court of Appeals denied his motion to dismiss, prompting this certiorari petition.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the appeal despite the alleged deficiencies in the record on appeal regarding the timeliness of its filing and the absence of a statement of its approval.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals. On the first contention, the Court held that while the record on appeal did not literally state its filing date, a holistic examination of the documents within it led to an inescapable conclusion that it was filed timely. The notice of appeal and appeal bond were filed on March 13, 1971. The motion for approval of the record on appeal was dated March 15, 1971, and set for hearing on March 27, 1971. Logic dictates that the record on appeal, referenced as an attachment to that motion, must have been filed before the hearing date of March 27. To insist otherwise would be an overly technical and illogical interpretation contrary to the evident facts on record.
Regarding the second contention, the Court clarified that Section 6, Rule 41 does not require the record on appeal to state that it has been approved by the trial court, as approval necessarily occurs after its filing. The fact of approval is properly indicated in the trial court’s order of approval and the subsequent transmittal and certification of the records under Section 11, Rule 41. In this case, the transmittal showed the approval order was issued on March 27, 1971. Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly gave due course to the appeal.