G.R. No. L-34381. May 31, 1977.
LORETO SEARES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CARMELO BARBERO and GAVINO BALBIN, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Loreto Seares filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking the cancellation of the certificates of candidacy of respondents Carmelo Barbero and Gavino Balbin for Governor and Vice-Governor of Abra, respectively, in the November 8, 1971 elections. The petition, filed under Section 31 of the Election Code of 1971, alleged that Barbero and Balbin had no bona fide intention to run for their declared offices. The specific claim was that during political rallies, Barbero stated that if elected, he would not qualify as Governor, allowing Balbin to assume that post while Barbero would remain as the incumbent Congressman. Seares argued this constituted a scheme to mislead voters and violated the law against nuisance candidates.
The COMELEC, through minute resolutions dated October 26, 1971, and November 10, 1971, denied Seares’s petition and subsequent motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Subsequently, Barbero and Balbin won the elections and were proclaimed Governor-elect and Vice-Governor-elect on December 1, 1971. Seares then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via certiorari, contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by not applying Section 31 to disqualify the respondents.

ISSUE

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition to cancel the certificates of candidacy of Barbero and Balbin.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as moot and academic. The legal logic proceeds from the supervening events that rendered the case without practical legal effect. First, respondent Carmelo Barbero failed to take his oath of office as Governor within the period mandated by Section 24 of the Election Code, which resulted in the forfeiture of his right to that office. Consequently, Gavino Balbin succeeded to the governorship pursuant to Section 17 of the same Code. Second, and decisively, by the time the Court resolved the petition in 1977, the four-year term for the offices contested in the 1971 elections had already expired. A judicial declaration on the propriety of the COMELEC’s 1971 resolutions would therefore have no consequential impact, as there was no longer any active controversy regarding the respondents’ right to hold the offices in question. The Court, following established principle, refrains from adjudicating matters where no actual substantial relief can be granted. The dismissal was without prejudice to the underlying legal questions, but based solely on the mootness of the case due to the expiration of the term of office.