G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, with RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, et al., Intervenors.

FACTS

Petitioner Arturo M. Tolentino, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, sought to prohibit the Commission on Elections and financial officers of the Convention from implementing a resolution of the Convention which proposed to submit to a plebiscite the question of lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 years. The resolution aimed to schedule this plebiscite concurrently with the November 1971 local elections. Tolentino contended that the Convention, as a constituent body called to draft a new constitution, lacked the authority to order such a plebiscite independently. He argued that this power resided solely in Congress under the then-operative 1935 Constitution, and that any proposed amendment, including this specific change, must be part of a complete revised constitution submitted for ratification at the Convention’s conclusion, not piecemeal.
The respondents and intervenors, fellow delegates, defended the resolution. They asserted that the Constitutional Convention, deriving its power directly from the sovereign people, possessed inherent constituent authority. This authority, they argued, included the power to propose specific amendments for separate ratification ahead of the completion of the entire draft, especially on a matter of significant public interest like suffrage. The case presented a direct clash between a strict, sequential view of the amending process and a more flexible view of the Convention’s plenary powers.

ISSUE

The principal issue was whether the 1971 Constitutional Convention had the constitutional authority to propose an isolated amendment to the 1935 Constitution—specifically, lowering the voting age—and submit it for ratification via plebiscite separately from, and prior to, the submission of a complete revised constitution.

RULING

The Supreme Court, by a sufficient majority, granted the petition and prohibited the implementation of the Convention’s resolution. The Court’s ruling rested on a strict construction of the constitutional amendment process as outlined in the 1935 Constitution. The legal logic centered on the distinction between the power to propose amendments and the power to promulgate or ratify them.
The Court held that while the Constitutional Convention was duly constituted to exercise the sovereign power to propose revisions or amendments, the manner of ratification was governed by the existing constitution. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution provided that amendments proposed by a convention “shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.” The Court interpreted this to mean that amendments must be submitted as a complete proposal or set of proposals for a singular ratifying act by the electorate. The Convention’s act of extracting a single amendment for piecemeal ratification was deemed beyond its power. The authority to call a plebiscite, set its date, and appropriate funds for it was held to be vested in Congress, not the Convention. Therefore, the resolution was invalid for attempting to exercise a power belonging to the legislative department under the prevailing fundamental law.