GR 34150 Fernando (Digest)
G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971
Arturo M. Tolentino, petitioner, vs. Commission on Elections, and The Chief Accountant, The Auditor, and The Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, respondents, with Raul S. Manglapus, et al., Intervenors.
FACTS
Petitioner Arturo M. Tolentino sought to prohibit the Commission on Elections and financial officers of the 1971 Constitutional Convention from implementing a resolution of the Convention to submit to the people in a plebiscite the question of whether they favor the amendment of the Constitution to shift from a presidential to a parliamentary system. The petitioner contended that the Constitutional Convention, as a mere creation of and subordinate to Congress, lacked the independent authority to initiate such a nationwide plebiscite. The intervenors, delegates to the Convention, argued for the Convention’s autonomous constituent power, positing it as a sovereign body directly representing the people in the exercise of the amendment power.
The core dispute centered on the nature and scope of the Constitutional Convention’s powers under the 1935 Constitution. Petitioner relied on theories of legislative supremacy over the Convention, while intervenors advanced the doctrine of conventional sovereignty, asserting the Convention was an alter ego of the sovereign people and thus not subject to legislative control.
ISSUE
The principal issue was whether the 1971 Constitutional Convention possessed the inherent authority to order the holding of a plebiscite on a proposed constitutional amendment independently of, and without prior legislative authorization from, Congress.
RULING
The Court, through Justice Barredo, upheld the authority of the Constitutional Convention to initiate the plebiscite. The legal logic rejected both extreme positions presented. The Court ruled that the Constitutional Convention is neither a subordinate entity of Congress nor a sovereign body. Instead, it is a coordinate department created directly by the Constitution itself, independent of Congress once convened. The Constitution vests the Convention with the constituent power to propose amendments. This grant of power is plenary and carries with it all necessary and incidental powers essential to discharge its mandate effectively, unless expressly limited by the Constitution itself.
Since the Constitution does not prohibit the Convention from ascertaining public sentiment on its proposals, and since submitting a proposal for ratification is the ultimate purpose of its work, the act of conducting a non-binding consultative plebiscite is a reasonable and incidental means to that end. It is a preparatory step integral to the amendment process. The Court found no constitutional provision stripping the Convention of such procedural discretion. Therefore, the Convention’s resolution was a valid exercise of its constitutionally derived constituent power, and the COMELEC, under its broad mandate to administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, could be tasked to implement it. The petition was dismissed.
