G.R. No. L-34112. June 25, 1980. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCISCO DE LA ROSA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch VII, Pasay City; and BERTI HILDEGARD EDERY, respondents.
FACTS

Respondent Berti Hildegard Edery was charged with violating Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The Information and Amended Information alleged that on October 8, 1968, at the Manila International Airport, she willfully and unlawfully brought into the country 28 pieces of gold bars, concealed within her person, without declaring them to customs authorities. This act was purportedly done through false statements and omissions to avoid the payment of duties and taxes, thereby defrauding the government. The accused filed a Motion to Quash, arguing the facts alleged did not constitute an offense.
The respondent judge granted the Motion to Quash. The prosecution then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and later a Motion to Reopen, requesting to present additional evidence. The court allowed a hearing where both parties presented evidence. Based on the evidence and admissions made by the prosecution during these hearings, the judge found that the gold bars were not “imported articles” as the accused lacked any intention to import them for commercial purposes, and her conduct was consistent with being a mere tourist in transit. Consequently, the court issued an order denying the Motion for Reconsideration and affirming the quashal of the information.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed reversible error in quashing the Information and Amended Information based on evidence and facts presented during the hearing on the Motion to Quash, rather than relying solely on the allegations within the four corners of the informations.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders of the respondent judge. The general rule is that a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense must be resolved solely on the basis of the allegations in the information, hypothetically admitting their truth. However, the Court recognized an established exception, as held in People vs. Navarro (75 Phil. 516). When, as in this case, additional facts are admitted by the prosecution or are not denied, and evidence is presented by both parties at the instance of the prosecution itself during the hearing on the motion, the court may consider such extrinsic evidence in resolving the motion.
Here, the prosecution actively participated in the hearing, presented evidence, and made certain admissions. This effectively transformed the proceeding into a trial on the merits. Considering the evidence, the respondent judge correctly concluded that, in light of the admitted facts—particularly the absence of any intent to import the gold bars for commercial purposes—the allegations, even if hypothetically true, did not constitute the offense of violating the Tariff and Customs Code. The Court held that to insist on a formal trial after such a proceeding would be a mere resort to technicality, contrary to the rules of procedure and the duty to dispense substantial justice. Therefore, no reversible error was committed.