GR 33915; (October, 1930) (Digest)

G.R. No. 33915, October 16, 1930
VICENTE SANTIAGO, as executor of Juan Dizon, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL and SIXTO DE LOS ANGELES, as executor of Marta Dizon, respondents.

FACTS

Juan Dizon died in 1927, and Vicente Santiago was appointed special administrator of his estate. Marta Dizon, a niece of Juan, later died, and Sixto de los Angeles became the administrator of her estate. Before her death, Marta took possession of a house and other property, claiming co-ownership. Vicente Santiago, as executor of Juan’s estate, filed eight claims totaling P3,534.24 against Marta’s estate before a committee on appraisal and claims. The majority of the committee allowed the claims, but one member dissented, arguing that since ownership of the properties was disputed, the claims should be resolved in separate actions, not through the committee. The executor of Marta’s estate did not appeal the committee’s report. Santiago later moved for payment of the claims, but the Court of First Instance denied the motion, holding that the committee had no jurisdiction and its report was null and void. Santiago then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the lower court to order payment.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance acted lawfully in setting aside the committee’s report and denying the motion for payment of the claims, thereby making mandamus an inappropriate remedy.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus. It held that the Court of First Instance acted lawfully in setting aside the committee’s report. The claims involved disputes over ownership of property (e.g., sheriff’s fees related to watching properties and agricultural products allegedly taken by Marta Dizon), which should be determined in an ordinary action under Section 703 of the Code of Civil Procedure, not in probate proceedings before a committee on appraisal and claims. Citing Franco vs. O’Brien, the Court reiterated that questions of ownership must be resolved in ordinary actions, regardless of whether the property is alleged to belong to the estate. Since the lower court’s order was lawful and Santiago had an adequate remedy by appeal, mandamus would not lie. Costs were imposed on the petitioner.