GR 33507; (July, 1981) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-33507 July 20, 1981
FE P. VELASCO, represented by ALFREDO GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR. and THE CITY OF DAVAO, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Fe P. Velasco filed a complaint to quiet title against the City of Davao in the Court of First Instance. She alleged ownership of Lot 77-B-2, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7000. She claimed that a recent relocation survey revealed that Bolton Street, a public road, had encroached upon a 25-square-meter portion of her lot. She asserted that this encroachment cast a cloud of doubt on her title, warranting judicial intervention to remove the cloud.
The City of Davao filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action. Respondent Judge Vicente Cusi Jr. granted the motion and dismissed the case. The court found that the material allegations in the complaint itself indicated Bolton Street was already an existing public highway when the petitioner bought the lot in 1956 and, crucially, when the mother title (Original Certificate of Title No. 638) for the parent lot (Lot 77) was issued in 1911.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action for quieting of title.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. In a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action, the allegations of the complaint are hypothetically admitted. The legal logic centers on Section 39 of Act No. 496 (the Land Registration Act), which governed the original registration. This provision states that a certificate of title is issued subject to subsisting “public highways,” even if not annotated on the title.
The complaint itself established that Bolton Street was a pre-existing public highway when the mother title was issued in 1911. Consequently, the easement for the public highway was a legal encumbrance that attached to the original Lot 77 by operation of law under Section 39. This encumbrance passed to all subsequent subdivisions of that lot, including the petitioner’s Lot 77-B-2. Since the street’s existence was a statutory burden on the title from its inception, the City’s use of the disputed strip did not create a new cloud on the title. The petitioner’s title was always subject to this encumbrance; therefore, there was no actionable cloud to be removed. The complaint, based on its own facts, failed to allege a valid cause of action for quieting title.