G.R. No. L-33400 January 31, 1973
TEODULO E. ABBU, petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDO TEVES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin; JULIO A. VIVARES, as Municipal Mayor of Mambajao, Province of Camiguin; MARCIANO LL. APARTE, JR., TORCUATO J. REYES, GIL G. FABE, and IGNACIO PENALOSA as Councilors of the same Municipality of Mambajao, Council of Mambajao, Province of Camiguin, represented by JULIO A. VIVARES, as Municipal Mayor of the said Municipality; and APOLONIA B. CIMACIO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Teodulo E. Abbu, a duly elected municipal councilor of Mambajao, Camiguin, was expelled from his position by a resolution of the Municipal Council, later approved by the Provincial Board. Consequently, he was barred from attending council sessions. Respondent Apolonia B. Cimacio was appointed to replace him. Abbu filed a suit for mandamus in the Court of First Instance to compel the municipal officials to recognize him as a councilor and allow him to perform his duties. He argued that the Office of the President had declared his expulsion illegal and void ab initio.
Respondent Judge Bernardo Teves dismissed the mandamus suit. The court ruled that the action was essentially one for quo warranto, which must be filed within one year from the date of ouster, a period that had already lapsed. Aggrieved, Abbu elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari, challenging the dismissal order.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court should resolve the merits of the petition for certiorari assailing the dismissal of the mandamus/quo warranto suit.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being moot and academic. The legal logic is anchored on the principle that courts will not adjudicate cases where no actual, substantial, and live controversy exists between the parties. The record showed that the petition was submitted for decision on December 7, 1971, and the term of office for the position of municipal councilor that Abbu was claiming expired on December 31, 1971. Therefore, even before the Court could render a decision, the specific term of office had ended.
The Court, citing the doctrine established in Gonzaga v. Bico, and subsequently adhered to in a line of cases including Tiburcio v. Municipal Court of Marikina, held that the expiration of the term of office renders the question of rightful title to that office academic. A judicial declaration on the matter would be ineffectual, as it could no longer restore petitioner to the contested office for the expired term. The resolution of the underlying legal issue—whether the suit was properly one for mandamus or quo warranto—became unnecessary. The mootness doctrine precludes the Court from exercising its power of judicial review when there is no longer any practical legal relief that can be granted. Consequently, without ruling on the procedural correctness of the lower court’s order, the petition was dismissed.