G.R. No. L-33168. January 11, 1973.
ENRIQUITA T. VIRAY, assisted by her husband, Pablo R. Viray, petitioner-appellant, vs. HELEN MARIÑAS, assisted by her husband Luciano Pineda Ong, and HON. JUDGE ROMAN CANCINO, JR., respondents-appellants.

FACTS

Respondent Helen Mariñas filed an initial ejectment case (Civil Case No. 121978) against petitioner Enriqueta Viray in the Manila City Court in 1964. The City Court granted Viray an extension to vacate until December 31, 1965, while ordering her to pay current and back rentals. Viray appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Civil Case No. 61994, which rendered a decision finding no reason to eject Viray as she was paying rent regularly, “without prejudice to plaintiff taking such other action as may be necessary and proper.” This CFI decision became final. Subsequently, in 1968, Mariñas filed a second complaint for ejectment (Civil Case No. 71861) in the CFI, alleging a new cause of action based on Viray’s refusal to pay an increased rental demanded in October 1967 and a subsequent demand to vacate in December 1967. The CFI dismissed this second case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the action, being based on a detainer occurring less than a year prior, fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the City Court.
Following this dismissal, Mariñas filed a third ejectment case (Civil Case No. 170347) in the City Court, realleging the cause of action from the second complaint. Viray moved to dismiss, arguing the action was barred by the final judgment in the first CFI case (61994). The City Court denied the motion. Viray then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CFI to annul that order, which was dismissed. The Court of Appeals later certified the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the third ejectment action (Civil Case No. 170347) is barred by res judicata due to the final judgment in the first CFI case (Civil Case No. 61994).

RULING

No, the third action is not barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court clarified the application of the doctrine, distinguishing between “bar by prior judgment” and “conclusiveness of judgment.” For res judicata to apply as a bar, there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the prior and subsequent cases. Here, while there was identity of parties and subject matter (the leased property), there was no identity of causes of action. The cause of action in the first case was based on the demand to vacate in April 1964 for commercial development. The cause of action in the third case was based on a new and distinct juridical fact: the demand for an increased rental in October 1967, the refusal to pay, and a subsequent demand to vacate in December 1967. These constituted a fresh breach, giving rise to a new cause of action for ejectment.
The final judgment in the first CFI case (61994) only adjudicated the rights of the parties relative to the 1964 demand. It did not and could not rule on the subsequent 1967 demand and refusal, which created a separate cause of action. Furthermore, the dismissal of the second CFI case (71861) was based purely on lack of jurisdiction and was not an adjudication on the merits; thus, it also could not operate as res judicata. Consequently, the City Court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the third case, as it was filed within one year from the accru