G.R. No. L-32950 July 30, 1971
JOSE C. LUCIANO and FLORENTINO S. ROLLS, petitioners, vs. HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, as JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL; HON. B. JOSE CASTILLO, as incumbent PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF RIZAL, and HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as former PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF RIZAL, respondents.

FACTS

This is a sequel to a prior case where the Supreme Court upheld the suspension of Makati’s elected mayor and other officials for graft. Petitioner Jose C. Luciano, then a councilor, assumed the position of Acting Mayor. However, prior to his assumption, Luciano and co-petitioner Florentino S. Rolls were themselves charged with violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) via an information filed by then Provincial Fiscal Benjamin H. Aquino. Petitioners alleged the information was filed without a proper preliminary investigation, as Fiscal Aquino filed it on the very day he took his oath as a judge. The Supreme Court, in the prior case, dismissed a prohibition petition but allowed petitioners to seek a preliminary investigation from the lower court. The trial court initially denied this, citing the fiscal’s certification, but suggested the incumbent fiscal could review the evidence. After a reinvestigation, Fiscal B. Jose Castillo maintained there was prima facie evidence. Consequently, the trial court issued an order on December 15, 1970, declaring the information valid and ordering Luciano’s suspension from office.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order declaring the information valid and ordering suspension without first conducting a hearing on the validity of the information as previously directed by the Supreme Court.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition, annulling the respondent judge’s order. The legal logic is clear: the trial court’s order was premature and constituted a denial of due process. The Supreme Court, in its prior resolution, had explicitly directed the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the validity of the information, specifically regarding the alleged lack of a proper preliminary investigation. The respondent judge disregarded this directive. Instead of holding the required evidentiary hearing to receive evidence and resolve the factual issue of whether a proper preliminary investigation was conducted, the judge preemptively ruled on the information’s validity based solely on the fiscal’s certification and reinvestigation report. This procedural shortcut deprived petitioners of their right to be heard on a critical jurisdictional question affecting the very foundation of the criminal case. The Court emphasized that the mandatory suspension under Section 13 of R.A. 3019 only applies when a valid information is pending. Therefore, a hearing to ascertain the information’s validity, particularly the regularity of the preliminary investigation, is a prerequisite before any suspension order can legally issue. By failing to hold this hearing, the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.