G.R. No. L-32676 August 31, 1971
ARROW TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HON. FILOMENO C. KINTANAR and SALVADOR B. JAPITANA, respondents.

FACTS

In PSC Case No. 70-1604, respondent Salvador B. Japitana applied for a certificate of public convenience to operate 20 PU automobile units in Cebu. The application, heard ex parte after due publication, was granted by Commissioner Filomeno C. Kintanar in a decision dated April 30, 1970. Petitioner Arrow Transportation Corporation, an existing operator in Cebu, filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging it was an affected operator but was not served copies of the application or hearing notice as required. The Public Service Commission en banc granted the motion on June 18, 1970, reopening the case and returning it to the Second Division to allow Arrow to present its evidence, effectively setting aside the April 30 decision.
Subsequently, on July 21, 1970, Japitana filed a petition with the PSC, claiming to be a holder of the certificate and requesting an extension of time to register the 20 units granted. Arrow opposed, arguing the June 18 order had vacated the underlying decision, leaving nothing to extend. Despite this, Commissioner Kintanar issued an order on August 5, 1970, granting Japitana a 60-day extension. Arrow’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this certiorari petition.

ISSUE

Whether the Public Service Commission, through Commissioner Kintanar, acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the August 5, 1970 order granting an extension to register units under a decision that had been vacated.

RULING

Yes, the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion and is therefore null and void. The legal logic is clear and sequential. The Commission en banc’s order of June 18, 1970, which granted Arrow’s motion for reconsideration, had the definitive effect of vacating and setting aside the initial decision of April 30, 1970. The explicit purpose was to reopen the case for a hearing de novo, allowing Arrow to file its opposition and present evidence. Consequently, as of June 18, the April 30 decision granting Japitana’s certificate ceased to be effective or enforceable; it was rendered non-existent for implementation purposes.
The August 5, 1970 order, which purported to extend the registration period for the units, was fundamentally baseless because it referred to a vacated decision. There was no valid certificate or final grant to which an extension could attach. The Court rejected the notion that the order could be construed as a provisional permit, as it was not framed as such and would contradict the Commission en banc’s directive for a completely new hearing. Arguments regarding transportation needs or monopoly concerns are evidentiary matters to be ventilated in the rehearing, not justifications for an order premised on a void decision. The writ of certiorari is granted, the August 5 order is annulled, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with the June 18, 1970 order.