G.R. No. 32622 , January 16, 1930
THE PROVINCE OF SURIGAO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE GERVASIO DIAZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Surigao, respondent.

FACTS

Pedro Ceda pleaded guilty in the Court of First Instance of Surigao to smoking opium in violation of the Opium Law. The trial judge, respondent Judge Gervasio Diaz, sentenced him to three months’ imprisonment and a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In the judgment, the judge additionally ordered that Ceda serve his sentence in Bilibid Prison in Manila, citing the accused’s addiction to opium and the need for him to receive treatment to cure the habit. The Provincial Fiscal of Surigao initiated certiorari proceedings, challenging the judge’s authority to order the confinement of a provincial prisoner in an insular prison.

ISSUE

Whether a Judge of First Instance has the authority to order a provincial prisoner, convicted of violating the Opium Law, to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the purpose of medical treatment and rehabilitation.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, holding that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction. The Court explained that Act No. 2381 , the Opium Law in force, prescribes penalties of imprisonment, fine, and deportation but does not grant courts the power to designate the place of imprisonment contrary to general provisions of law. Under the Administrative Code, a person sentenced for a violation like Ceda’s is considered a provincial prisoner to be detained in a provincial jail (Sections 17391741).

The trial judge relied on Section 1750 of the Administrative Code and administrative circulars from 1913 and 1923. However, Section 1750 exclusively vests discretion in the Governor-General to transfer prisoners from provincial or municipal jails to insular prisons when public interest requires. The cited circulars were ineffective; the 1923 circular referred to an obsolete law ( Act No. 1761 ) and was issued by officials without authority. The Court emphasized that the power to transfer prisoners for medical treatment rests with the Chief Executive, not the judiciary. While well-intentioned, the judge’s order lacked legal basis. The writ was granted without costs.