G.R. No. 32560 , February 1, 1930
JUAN TONG and J. Q. COO TENG HEE, petitioners, vs. F. SANTAMARIA, Judge of First Instance of Iloilo, and THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, respondents.

FACTS

1. The Standard Oil Company of New York sued its sales agent, Cho Siong, and his sureties, Ong Guan Can and Sun Sy Tong, for unpaid obligations.
2. During the suit, the court attached Ong Guan Can’s property. To dissolve this attachment, Cho Siong deposited a cash bond (manager’s check for P3,000) with the court.
3. Later, Cho Siong replaced the cash bond with a personal bond of P6,000, subscribed by petitioners Juan Tong and J. Q. Coo Teng Hee, as sureties. The bond conditionally obligated them to redeliver the released property (or pay its value) to satisfy any judgment against Cho Siong.
4. The Supreme Court, in a related appeal ( G.R. No. 29588 ), ruled that surety Ong Guan Can was only liable for Cho Siong’s debts under the agency contract, not for a separate debt of a prior agent (Tong Kuan) that Cho Siong had assumed without Ong Guan Can’s knowledge. Consequently, Ong Guan Can’s liability was limited to P64.40, fully covered by Cho Siong’s initial cash deposit.
5. After remand, the trial judge (respondent Santamaria) issued a writ of execution on November 5, 1929, ordering petitioners (the new sureties) to pay P2,197.42the amount of the judgment against Cho Siong for the prior agent’s debtclaiming they were liable under their bond.
6. Petitioners sought to prohibit the judge from enforcing this writ, arguing it was void as it sought to hold them liable for a debt not covered by their bond.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of execution against petitioners (sureties on the bond for the dissolution of attachment) is valid, given that the Supreme Court had previously limited the liability of the original surety (Ong Guan Can) to a specific amount fully covered by the cash deposit, and the judgment sought to be enforced against petitioners pertained to a different debt.

RULING

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, quashed the writ of execution, and made the preliminary injunction permanent.

1. Nature of the Surety Bond: The bond executed by petitioners was given under Section 440 of the Code of Civil Procedure to secure the release of the specific property (Ong Guan Can’s) that had been attached. Its purpose was to ensure that the released property could be applied to satisfy any valid judgment against the owner of that property (Ong Guan Can). It did not create a general liability for any and all judgments against the principal defendant (Cho Siong).

2. Scope of Liability Limited to Property Owner’s Debt: The Court held that the liability of the sureties (petitioners) on such a bond is co-extensive with the liability of the owner of the attached property whose release it secures. Since the Supreme Court had already definitively ruled in G.R. No. 29588 that Ong Guan Can’s liability was only P64.40 (fully satisfied by the cash deposit), there was no remaining judgment obligation against Ong Guan Can’s property that the bond could be called upon to satisfy.

3. Invalidity of the Execution: The trial judge’s order directing execution against petitioners for the larger sum representing Cho Siong’s personal liability (for the prior agent’s debt) exceeded the scope of the bond and the final judgment of the Supreme Court. The lower court had no authority to alter or expand the Supreme Court’s final determination of Ong Guan Can’s liability.

4. Propriety of the Remedy (Prohibition/Certiorari): The Court found the writ of prohibition appropriate because the respondent judge was acting without or in excess of jurisdiction by issuing an execution not authorized by the final judgment. The Court also noted, per Justice Street’s concurrence, that the petition could be treated as one for certiorari, as the order was a nullity for want of authority.

DOCTRINE:
A bond given for the dissolution of an attachment under Section 440 of the Code of Civil Procedure secures only the obligation of the owner of the attached property released. The sureties’ liability is limited to the value of that property and is co-extensive with the finally adjudicated liability of that property owner. A lower court cannot, by a writ of execution, enforce against such sureties a judgment debt that has been definitively ruled as not being the liability of the owner of the released property.