G.R. No. L-32475. April 30, 1980.
JESUS DAYAO, petitioner, vs. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LTD. and HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City, respondents.

FACTS

Shell Company filed an ejectment complaint against Jesus Dayao in the Quezon City Court, alleging a sub-lease terminable upon ninety days’ written notice. Shell claimed it sent a termination notice, but Dayao refused to vacate. Dayao countered that their agreement allowed termination only for a violation of its terms, which Shell did not allege. The City Court, after trial where Shell presented evidence of contractual violations (e.g., sourcing gasoline elsewhere), dismissed the complaint, finding no justifiable cause for ejectment within the pleaded cause of action. Shell appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI).
In the CFI, Shell moved to admit an Amended Complaint to “tender the real issues,” which included allegations of Dayao’s specific breaches of the sub-lease. Shell also moved for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore its possession. Respondent Judge admitted the amended complaint and granted the writ upon a bond. Dayao filed this certiorari and prohibition petition, arguing the CFI acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment and issuing the injunction.

ISSUE

1. Could Shell amend its complaint on appeal to the CFI after its original ejectment complaint was dismissed by the City Court?
2. Could the CFI issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the appealed unlawful detainer case to deprive Dayao of possession?

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled against the petitioner. On the first issue, the amendment was permissible. While an appeal in ejectment cases proceeds as a trial de novo, the CFI acquires original jurisdiction. Amendments to pleadings are generally allowed to serve the ends of justice, provided no new cause of action is introduced or the adverse party is not prejudiced. Here, the amendment did not allege a new cause of action; it merely elaborated on the grounds for ejectment by specifying the alleged violations of the contract, which were already touched upon during the trial in the inferior court. The amendment aimed to formalize the issues already in controversy.
On the second issue, the issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction was legally sound. The Court anchored its decision on Article 1674 of the Civil Code, which provides that in ejectment cases where the lessor appeals, the appellate court may, upon a prima facie showing of merit, issue a writ of execution or a preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the lessor to possession. This provision was designed precisely to remedy the injustice of a lessee remaining in possession during a protracted appeal. The respondent Judge found Shell’s appeal prima facie meritorious, a determination within his discretion. The bond posted by Shell adequately secured Dayao against potential damages if the appeal ultimately failed. Therefore, the respondent Judge acted within legal bounds, and no grave abuse of discretion was committed. The petition was denied, and the case was remanded for determination on the merits.