G.R. Nos. 32394 and 32395, September 5, 1930
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. SANDAL, ARIMAO, LONSING, MAMA, and PAMPANG

FACTS

The appellants, all Moros, were convicted of murder for killing Eleno Lamorena on February 18, 1929, in Abaga, Lanao. The prosecution presented eyewitness Inambar, who testified that appellant Sandal called the deceased, and while they were talking, appellant Pampang struck the deceased on the back of the neck with a hammer, felling him. Sandal and the other appellants then closed in and beat him to death. Another witness, Dimaponong, testified that later that night, he saw the appellants carrying the corpse of Eleno and throwing it into a river. The body was later recovered from the location he indicated. The post-mortem examination revealed multiple severe injuries consistent with a violent assault. The motive established was that the deceased was to be the principal witness in a complaint filed by his employer, Tomas Permites, against the appellants for injuring Permites’ carabaos. The appellants denied the accusations and attempted to prove an alibi.

ISSUE

1. Whether the trial court erred in its assessment of the evidence and in finding the appellants guilty of murder.
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit the testimony of a defense witness who violated the order to exclude witnesses.
3. Whether the trial court erred in not requiring the fiscal to present the testimony from the preliminary investigation.
4. Whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for extension of time to present another witness.

RULING

1. NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s findings, holding that the evidence sufficiently established the appellants’ guilt. The eyewitness account, corroborated by another witness who saw the disposal of the body and the physical evidence from the autopsy, supported the conclusion that the appellants killed the deceased in the manner described. The court found no error in the trial court’s weighing of the evidence.
2. NO, the error was not prejudicial. While the Supreme Court opined that the trial court should have admitted the testimony of the defense witness who remained in court despite an exclusion order (especially since the witness claimed not to have heard the other testimonies), the error was not reversible. The appellants failed to show what the witness would have testified to or how his exclusion materially prejudiced their defense. The matter of admitting such testimony is within the court’s discretion.
3. NO. The trial court’s failure to require the fiscal to present the testimony from the preliminary investigation did not constitute reversible error. Its only effect was to entitle the defense to present secondary evidence of that testimony for the purpose of impeaching the witnesses’ credibility, had they been presented at the trial.
4. NO. The denial of the motion for an extension of time to present Dr. Feliciano was within the trial court’s sound discretion. No abuse of discretion was shown, especially since the defense did not inform the court of the nature of the doctor’s proposed testimony.

DISPOSITION: The judgment of the Court of First Instance convicting the appellants of murder and sentencing each to twenty years of cadena temporal with accessories, indemnity, and costs was AFFIRMED.