G.R. No. L-32164. January 31, 1973.
Florenda Ariem, petitioner, vs. Hon. Walfrido de los Angeles, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IV; People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation and The City Sheriff, respondents.

FACTS

In Civil Case No. Q-12775, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a final and executory judgment on December 4, 1969, in favor of respondent People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC) against defendant Nicasio Barles. The judgment ordered Barles to vacate Lot No. 16 in Quezon City, a registered property of PHHC, and to remove his house and constructions thereon. A writ of execution was subsequently issued. On May 14, 1970, petitioner Florenda Ariem filed a petition in the same case to lift the writ of execution, with a prayer for a preliminary injunction. She claimed to be the bona fide occupant of the lot, asserting that Barles was merely her caretaker, and argued that executing the judgment against her without due process would deprive her of property.
The respondent Judge denied Ariem’s petition in an order dated June 24, 1970. Ariem then filed this petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify that order and to enjoin the execution, contending the judge committed grave abuse of discretion. She cited jurisprudence stating that a bona fide possessor not party to an action cannot be bound by its judgment.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition to lift the writ of execution.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the principle that a judgment in an ejectment case binds not only the named defendant but also their family members, relatives, and other privies who derive their possession from the defendant. The Court found that Nicasio Barles was the real party-in-interest. The records showed he actively participated in the case by filing a motion to dismiss and, after a default judgment was rendered, a petition for relief to protect his interest in the lot. His actions unequivocally demonstrated he was the actual possessor.
Ariem’s claim of being the bona fide occupant, with Barles as a mere caretaker, was deemed a flimsy pretext to delay execution. The Court noted she is Barles’s mother-in-law, and her belated intervention, after Barles’s own legal maneuvers failed, suggested a coordinated effort to frustrate the judgment. As a relative and privy of Barles, she is bound by the judgment against him under the doctrine established in Gozon vs. De la Rosa. The cases she cited were distinguished, as they involved possessors in good faith who were not relatives or privies of the defendant and did not derive their possession from them. The respondent Judge properly evaluated her claim during the hearing on her petition and correctly found it insufficient to warrant lifting the execution. The petition was merely a dilatory tactic.