G.R. No. L-31591. June 30, 1971.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN COMPENSATION COMMISSION and LILIA VDA. DE SALAMEDA, in her behalf and in behalf of her minor children GILDA and JOSEPHINE both surnamed SALAMEDA, respondents.

FACTS

Fortunato Salameda, an employee of Manila Electric Company (Meralco), worked as a laborer, steelman, and finally a boiler maker. His duties involved physical exertion, including digging, lifting steel and pipes, and assisting in welding. In 1964, he began experiencing symptoms such as reddened eyes and nosebleeds, which his physician attributed to the heat from his welding job. Despite medical advice to rest, he continued working. His condition deteriorated, and on May 14, 1966, he suffered severe headaches, vomiting, and blurred vision, forcing him to stop work. Meralco eventually hospitalized him at its John F. Cotton Hospital, where he was diagnosed with a cerebral brain tumor. He died on June 30, 1966, before scheduled surgery. His heirs filed a claim for death benefits, disability compensation, and medical expenses.
Meralco contested the claim, arguing the illness was not work-related and that the nature of Salameda’s work was light. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission reversed the Acting Referee’s dismissal, awarding death compensation, burial expenses, disability compensation for the period from May 14 to June 30, 1966, and attorney’s fees. Meralco appealed, questioning the findings on aggravation, the award of disability benefits alongside death benefits, and the propriety of the attorney’s fees award.

ISSUE

The issues are: (1) whether the brain tumor was aggravated by the nature of Salameda’s employment; (2) whether the award of disability compensation for the period of illness prior to death is proper when death benefits are also awarded; and (3) whether the Commission can award attorney’s fees motu proprio.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision. On the first issue, the Court upheld the Commission’s factual finding, supported by substantial evidence, that Salameda’s work involved significant physical exertion, not merely light duties. While a brain tumor is not an occupational disease, compensability is established if the work aggravated the condition. The progressive manifestation of symptoms from 1964 until his incapacitation in 1966, coupled with medical testimony that fatigue could influence such conditions, sufficiently supported the conclusion that his employment at least aggravated his illness, warranting compensation.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that awarding both disability compensation for the period of incapacity before death and death benefits is legally sound. Section 12 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act explicitly provides that the period of disability shall be deducted from the total period for death compensation (208 weeks). The Commission correctly computed the death benefits by deducting the 6 1/7 weeks of disability compensation from the maximum period, ensuring no double compensation but recognizing the separate entitlement to benefits for the temporary total disability suffered prior to death.
On the third issue, the award of attorney’s fees was proper. The Court held that Section 31 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4119 , explicitly provides that attorney’s fees for services rendered in prosecuting a claim “shall be chargeable against said employer.” This statutory language makes such fees an integral part of the compensation due, eliminating the need for a specific prayer or proof. The amendment overruled prior jurisprudence requiring a dispute between claimant and counsel, thereby authorizing the Commission to award fees motu proprio. Costs were imposed on the petitioner.