G.R. No. L-31569 September 28, 1973
INES LORBES PADILLA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HERMINIO MARIANO, as presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, FLORENCIO NADERA, respondents.

FACTS

The property in question, formerly owned by Vicente Padilla, was foreclosed by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) after he defaulted on a loan. The redemption period expired on October 7, 1961. The following day, Vicente Padilla, his wife Ines, and daughter Fe executed an Agreement of Purchase and Sale over the property in favor of respondent Florencio Nadera for P35,000, despite having already lost the right to redeem. Nadera paid P10,000 and assumed the balance of the Padilla debt to GSIS. Subsequently, GSIS consolidated title in its own name.
Nadera later discovered the Padillas’ lack of redemption rights. He nevertheless reimbursed Vicente Padilla for a pension amount of P10,194.24 that GSIS had applied to the loan, and made direct payments to GSIS totaling P15,865.16. GSIS, however, executed a deed of absolute sale on September 19, 1963, reconveying the property to the spouses Vicente and Ines Padilla for a stated consideration matching one of Nadera’s payments. The next day, Vicente Padilla alone (without Ines) executed a “Deed of Confirmation of Sale” in favor of Nadera. Relying on this, Nadera secured title in his name. The Padilla heirs (petitioners) sued to annul the confirmation deed and recover the property. The trial court ruled for Nadera and ordered the petitioners to pay damages and attorney’s fees. Pending the petitioners’ appeal, the trial court granted Nadera’s motion for immediate execution of the judgment, which the Court of Appeals sustained.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the immediate execution of its judgment pending appeal.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that no grave abuse of discretion attended the order for immediate execution. The Court emphasized that execution pending appeal under the then Rule 39, Section 2, is discretionary, requiring good reasons stated in a special order. The trial court’s reasons—that the appeal was dilatory, the judgment appeared clearly meritorious, and the petitioners’ adverse claim on the title clouded Nadera’s ownership, thereby depreciating the property’s value—were deemed sufficient and constituted a valid exercise of discretion. The Court found these reasons to be “good reasons” as contemplated by the rules, as they pertained to the potential devaluation of the property due to the litigation’s pendency, which is a recognized ground for immediate execution to prevent further damage. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the issues on appeal were so weighty as to preclude execution, noting that the determination of a judgment’s apparent merit for purposes of execution pending appeal rests primarily with the trial court. The Court also clarified that the propriety of the underlying judgment on the merits was not the issue in the certiorari proceeding, which was limited to reviewing the discretion exercised in granting execution pending appeal. The petition was dismissed.