G.R. No. 31265 , November 12, 1929
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. MAXIMO N. CRUZ

FACTS

Maximo N. Cruz was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for violating Ordinance No. 4, series of 1928, of the municipality of Cabanatuan, as amended. The ordinance prohibited the installation of any kind of engines within a designated “Machinery Zone,” except for engines used for “Delco Lights and Cinematographs.” Cruz was sentenced to pay a fine. On appeal, he challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional, arguing it was unjust, discriminatory, beyond the municipal council’s power, and that his conviction was without due process.

ISSUE

1. Whether Ordinance No. 4, as amended, is unconstitutional for being unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory, and violative of equal protection.
2. Whether the municipal council exceeded its authority in enacting the ordinance.
3. Whether Cruz was deprived of due process of law.

RULING

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the conviction, holding:
1. Validity of Zoning Ordinance: Municipal councils are empowered under the police power (Section 2238, Revised Administrative Code) to enact zoning ordinances. The ordinance in question, which regulated the installation of engines within a specific zone, is a valid exercise of this power.
2. Authority to Regulate Engines: The municipal council’s authority under Section 2243(n) of the Revised Administrative Code to regulate steam boilers extends to motor engines, as both are similarly dangerous and used for industrial purposes. The power to “regulate” includes the authority to prohibit installation within a designated zone, which is a form of regulation through zonification.
3. Non-Violation of Equal Protection: The classification exempting Delco Light and Cinematograph engines is reasonable and just. Such engines provide public amusement and diversion, unlike industrial engines (e.g., for sawing wood) which may create nuisances like noise. The distinction does not constitute unlawful discrimination.
4. Due Process Not Violated: Cruz was not denied due process. He did not invoke his right under Section 30 of General Orders No. 58 to have at least two days to prepare for trial after arraignment. The Court cited precedent (McMicking vs. Schields) that failure to request time for preparation waives such right.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid police power measure, and the judgment of the lower court was affirmed.