G.R. No. L-31261-2-3-4-5 April 20, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO CATOLICO, DISTRICT JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BRANCH III, TIBURCIO SANTERO, and EPIFANIA ILANO, respondents.

FACTS

Five criminal cases for estafa were filed against private respondents Tiburcio Santero and Epifania Ilano in July 1966. After arraignment in December 1967, joint trial commenced. The prosecution rested its case in August 1968. The defense began presenting evidence in September 1968, securing multiple postponements. The original presiding judge, Judge Jose B. Jimenez, was appointed to another court and was succeeded by respondent Judge Alfredo Catolico in July 1969. The cases were set for continuation of defense evidence on August 5, 1969, but the defense secured a seventh postponement. The trial was reset to September 8, 1969.
On September 8, 1969, instead of presenting evidence, the new defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss. The motion cited Rule 22, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, arguing that the court had lost authority to try the cases because hearings had been adjourned for more than 90 days without a written authority from the Chief Justice for the new judge to continue the trial. Respondent Judge Catolico granted the motion and dismissed the cases on the same day, without giving the prosecution an opportunity to oppose and adding a ground of “lack of interest to prosecute.” The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the criminal cases based on an alleged violation of Rule 22, Section 3, and on the ground of lack of interest to prosecute.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, annulled the dismissal orders, and ordered the reinstatement and continuation of the trials. The Court held that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion. First, the provision in Rule 22, Section 3 is merely directory, not mandatory. Its purpose is to expedite trials and prevent undue delays, but a violation does not nullify proceedings or divest the court of jurisdiction. Established jurisprudence, notably Barrueco v. Abeto, holds that the requirement for written authority from the Chief Justice after a three-month adjournment is procedural and directory. The judge’s duty is to proceed with the trial, not to dismiss the case.
Second, the added ground of “lack of interest to prosecute” was baseless and constituted a capricious disregard of the record. The prosecution had long rested its case, and the delays were primarily caused by the defense’s numerous postponements. The judge’s actions suggested a pre-conceived plan to dismiss the cases, as he suggested the motion’s ground to defense counsel and ruled immediately without a hearing. The Supreme Court emphasized that a judge must dispose of the court’s business promptly but must also resist any outside influence and decide cases based on law and evidence, not personal predilections. The dismissal orders were declared null and void.