G.R. No. 31123, August 27, 1929
PHILIPPINE GUARANTY CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARMEN BELANDO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The case was set for hearing on September 13, 1928. The defendant (Carmen Belando) and her counsel were absent at the scheduled time. The trial court proceeded with the hearing in their absence and received the plaintiff’s evidence. Later that same day, the defendant’s counsel filed a sworn motion explaining that his tardiness was due to automobile tire trouble, which caused a 40-minute delay. The motion also alleged that the defendant had a “very strong defense” that would result in a favorable decision. The motion prayed for the setting aside of any orders from the hearing and the setting of a new trial date. Before the scheduled hearing of this motion on September 22, 1928, the trial court rendered judgment on September 17, 1928, in favor of the plaintiff. On September 22, the court heard the motion and, after giving the defendant an opportunity to elaborate on the nature of her “strong defense” (which she refused to do), denied it for lack of affidavits of merit showing a just and valid defense. The defendant appealed, arguing that the denial of her motion for new trial was an abuse of discretion and that the trial court erred in amending the bill of exceptions to include an account of the September 22 hearing.

ISSUE

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
2. Whether the trial court erred in ordering the amendment of the bill of exceptions to include the incidents of the hearing on the motion for new trial.

RULING

1. No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The grant or denial of a motion for new trial under Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure is discretionary. The trial court acted within its discretion when it proceeded with the hearing in the defendant’s absence, as no cause for postponement was shown at that time. Regarding the motion for new trial, the court impliedly denied it by rendering judgment beforehand. Later, during the hearing on the motion, the court gave the defendant a chance to substantiate her claim of a “strong defense,” but she refused. The defendant’s sole defense in her answer was a denial of the agency granted to Jose Gomez Marino. This defense was contradicted by the plaintiff’s evidence, a public instrument (Exhibit A) expressly granting the agent authority “to make and accept loans” and “to mortgage” property. Given the documentary evidence and the defendant’s failure to show a meritorious defense, the denial of the motion for new trial was proper and not an abuse of discretion.

2. No, the trial court did not err in amending the bill of exceptions. Section 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge to restate the facts and exceptions to clarify the questions of law involved. The insertion of the incidents from the September 22 hearing was necessary to explain the context and correctness of the order denying the new trial. The amendment was within the court’s authority.

The appealed order was affirmed, with costs against the appellant.