GR 30960; (October, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 30960 October 5, 1989
MACARIA ABARRIENTOS VDA. DE CAPULONG, ET AL. vs. WORKMEN’S INSURANCE CO., INC. AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
Private respondent Workmen’s Insurance Co., Inc. received a copy of the trial court’s adverse decision on January 4, 1969. On February 3, 1969, the final day of the 30-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal, it filed a motion for an extension of at least thirty days to file its record on appeal. The trial judge, Hon. Federico Alikpala, issued an order on February 4, 1969, granting only a ten-day extension but without specifying the commencement date. The respondent received this order on February 7, 1969, and subsequently filed its record on appeal on February 14, 1969.
Judge Alikpala disapproved the record on appeal as filed out of time. He ruled that the 10-day extension period commenced immediately after the original deadline of February 3, 1969, thus expiring on February 13, 1969. The Court of Appeals reversed this ruling upon a petition for certiorari, holding that the extension period should be counted from the movant’s receipt of the extension order on February 7, 1969, making the February 14 filing timely.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to grant the motion for extension filed on the last day of the appeal period, and from which date the granted extension period should be computed.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The trial court validly retained jurisdiction to act on the motion for extension filed before the expiration of the reglementary period. Citing Buena v. Surtida and Singbengco v. Arellano, the Court held that a motion for extension filed within the original appeal period remains within the court’s discretionary power to grant, even if the order granting it is issued after the original period lapses. The filing of such a motion does not suspend the period’s run, but the court’s favorable action on it, while still possessing jurisdiction over the motion, validly extends the period for compliance.
Consequently, the extension period rightly commenced from the respondent’s receipt of the favorable order on February 7, 1969, not from the original deadline. The record on appeal filed on February 14, 1969, was therefore filed within the granted 10-day extension. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the appeal was futile simply because the principal defendant’s appeal had been dismissed. The insurer’s separate appeal could potentially affect intertwined rights and liabilities, meriting a review on the merits. The appeal was declared perfected.