G.R. No. L-30668 July 21, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO REYES, ET AL., defendants, RICARDO MAMON alias “CADONG”, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

On July 11, 1968, Municipal Judge Ruperto Advincula was shot and killed point-blank while on board a train in Pototan, Iloilo. Investigations identified the assailants as Rodolfo Reyes and Ricardo Mamon, with Mamon as the alleged triggerman. Mamon remained at large for over four months despite a manhunt. He eventually surfaced in the Iloilo Provincial Jail on November 30, 1968, claiming to have surrendered. During custodial investigation, Mamon confessed to the killing, stating it was done for a promised payment of P1,500 from one Federico Baylon.
An information for Murder was filed. Initially pleading not guilty, Mamon later withdrew this plea and entered a plea of guilty. His counsel then sought to prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Witnesses, including the Provincial Governor and a Board Member, testified that Mamon’s surrender was negotiated through relatives and was conditional. The conditions included assurances of no physical harm, confinement outside PC headquarters, lenient treatment, and a lighter penalty. The trial court convicted Mamon of Murder, appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the generic aggravating circumstance of price or reward. It rejected the claim of voluntary surrender and imposed the death penalty.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of price or reward and correctly rejected the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, thereby justifying the imposition of the death penalty.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua due to lack of the necessary votes to sustain the death penalty. The Court upheld the trial court’s findings on the aggravating circumstance and the rejection of the mitigating circumstance. The legal logic is clear: for price or reward to be aggravating, the prosecution must prove the accused was promised a consideration for the killing. Mamon’s own extrajudicial confession, where he admitted the agreement and partial payment of P1,000 for the murder, constituted sufficient proof. This confession was properly admitted as it was given without evidence of coercion and after he was informed of his rights.
Regarding voluntary surrender, the Court ruled the circumstance was not present. Jurisprudence requires the surrender to be spontaneous, showing the accused’s intent to unconditionally submit to authorities, either acknowledging guilt or saving the state effort and expense. Mamon’s actions did not meet this criterion. He evaded arrest for months, necessitating an extensive manhunt. His surrender was negotiated and conditional, motivated more by a desire for safety and leniency after hiding became perilous, rather than by a genuine intent to submit unconditionally. Therefore, the trial court correctly rejected it as a mitigating circumstance. The penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua in line with the prevailing rules on the imposition of the death penalty.