G.R. No. L-30532 November 29, 1977
AMER M. BALINDONG, petitioner, vs. LINANG D. MANDANGAN, in his capacity as Provincial Governor of Lanao del Sur, KASAN A. MAROHOMBSAR, in his capacity as Vice-Governor, IBRAHIM ALI and BAJUNAID BALT, in their capacity as members of the Provincial Board, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Amer M. Balindong, then the Mayor of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, filed a certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenging the validity of an order of preventive suspension issued against him by the respondents, the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, and members of the Provincial Board of Lanao del Sur. The suspension was based on two pending administrative complaints against the petitioner for oppression, dishonesty, and misconduct in office. This Court, in a resolution dated May 30, 1969, required respondents to answer and issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the preventive suspension order.
Respondents duly filed their answer on June 23, 1969, praying for the lifting of the preliminary injunction. While the Court required petitioner to answer that plea, it did not grant the lifting. Both parties subsequently filed other pleadings and memoranda. In their last pleading, respondents admitted that by December 31, 1971, the case would become moot and academic.
ISSUE
Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the preventive suspension order has been rendered moot and academic.
RULING
Yes, the petition is dismissed for being moot and academic. The Court’s legal logic rests on the principle that it will not determine questions that no longer present a justiciable controversy because the issues have been resolved or have ceased to exist. A significant passage of time and intervening supervening events had rendered the core issue of the validity of the 1969 preventive suspension order devoid of practical legal consequence.
Crucially, respondents themselves admitted the case would be moot by the end of 1971. Subsequent historical and legal developments solidified this position. The regular elections for provincial and municipal officials in 1971 were held, and the present Constitution was adopted on January 17, 1973. There was no showing that the parties retained the specific official positions they held at the time of the suspension order’s issuance. Furthermore, under Presidential Decree Nos. 925 and 826, substantial changes were introduced to the very structure and nomenclature of local legislative bodies, including provincial boards. Therefore, any ruling on the propriety of the suspension issued by a now-defunct provincial board structure would serve no purpose. The Court thus refrained from issuing an adjudication on a matter that no longer presented an active controversy.
