G.R. No. L-30434 August 31, 1981
FELOMENA, MARIA, GREGORIO, ANTIPAS, TEODORA, TERESITA, VICTORINA, ESTELITA, SOTERA and FELICISIMO, all surnamed FABIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TEOFILO FABIO, LILIA FABIO, MODESTA CATAYOC, ILUMINADA CATAYOC and PRIMO CONEJOS, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners, defendants in a civil case, appealed an adverse decision to the Court of Appeals. They timely filed their record on appeal. The appellate court’s clerk issued a notice on April 23, 1968, requiring their appeal brief within 45 days from receipt. Their counsel of record, Atty. Victorino C. Teleron, received the notice on May 11, 1968. However, Atty. Teleron had been appointed Presiding District Judge of Bohol in September 1967 and had relocated. On June 19, 1968, before the brief deadline, he filed a petition to withdraw as counsel, informing the court of his new judicial role and requesting a 45-day extension for petitioners to secure new counsel.
On July 9, 1968, petitioners’ newly retained counsel, Atty. Froilan R. Montalban, filed a motion for a 45-day extension to file the brief. Before the court acted on these pleadings, the new counsel filed the appellants’ brief on September 4, 1968. Private respondents did not oppose any of these motions or the brief’s filing.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal for alleged late filing of the appellants’ brief.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus, ruling that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the principle that courts should administer rules of procedure to promote substantial justice, not to defeat it. Here, petitioners, through their original counsel who had become a judge, acted with reasonable diligence. Atty. Teleron’s petition for withdrawal, filed before the original deadline, was a valid notification of his incapacity to continue representation due to his judicial office. The subsequent engagement of new counsel and the filing of a motion for extension demonstrated a bona fide effort to comply.
Critically, the brief was filed on September 4, 1968, and no opposition was lodged by the appellees. The Court of Appeals’ dismissal, after denying both the withdrawal and extension motions, was a stark and unexplained departure from its own consistent policy of liberally granting extensions to file briefs, as evidenced by its actions in other contemporaneous cases cited by petitioners. The dismissal under these circumstances was overly technical, arbitrary, and deprived petitioners of their right to appeal on the merits. The Supreme Court directed the reinstatement of the appeal and the admission of the brief as timely filed. The Court also admonished lawyers appointed to public office to promptly withdraw from cases to avoid similar prejudice to their clients.
