G.R. No. L-30375 September 12, 1978
JOSE ESCRIBANO, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID P. AVILA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato (First Branch) and SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, respondents.

FACTS

On September 25, 1968, Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun filed a complaint for libel directly with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cotabato against Mayor Jose Escribano. The complaint, subscribed before respondent Judge David P. Avila, alleged that Escribano, in a broadcasted speech, called Pendatun “the worst animal that ever live in this province.” Judge Avila, in subsequent 1969 orders, asserted his authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of the libel charge, received the complainant’s evidence, and found probable cause. He ordered Escribano’s arrest and referred the case to the city fiscal for the filing of an information. Escribano challenged this authority via certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, arguing that the power to conduct a preliminary investigation for libel was vested exclusively in the city fiscal of Cotabato City under its charter and in the city fiscal or municipal court under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance of Cotabato retained the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation in a libel case, or whether such power was exclusively lodged in the city fiscal or municipal court under the applicable statutes.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, Jose Escribano. It held that the CFI of Cotabato had no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. The legal logic centered on statutory construction of Republic Act No. 4363, which amended Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. This law specifically provided that preliminary investigations for written defamation “shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province.” The Court emphasized that the clear legislative intent was to designate these specific officers and courts, thereby excluding the Court of First Instance from conducting such investigations. This interpretation was aligned with the amendment’s purpose to prevent harassment through out-of-town libel suits by limiting the venues for preliminary investigations. While Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court generally allowed a CFI judge to conduct a preliminary investigation upon a complaint filed directly with it, this general rule must yield to the special and later law, Republic Act No. 4363, which created a specific and exclusive procedure for libel cases. Consequently, Judge Avila’s orders were set aside for having been issued without jurisdiction. The Court made permanent the restraining order against proceeding with the arraignment.