G.R. No. 30270, October 19, 1928
ANACLETA CORTES, VDA. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAPIZ and “LEDESMA HERMANOS AND PEDRO DE LA VIÑA,” respondents.

DOCTRINE:
Laches or unreasonable delay in filing a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel a judge to approve a bill of exceptions is a sufficient ground for the denial of the writ, especially when the delay prejudices the rights of the adverse party.

FACTS

1. The case originated from Civil Case No. 1875, where a decision was rendered on November 22, 1926.
2. The trial judge disapproved the bill of exceptions on September 29, 1927.
3. A motion for reconsideration of this disapproval was denied on January 21, 1928. Petitioner’s counsel claims to have been notified of this denial on March 2, 1928.
4. Despite this, the petitioner took no action until preparing a petition for a writ of mandamus dated July 16, 1928, which was only filed with the Supreme Court on September 3, 1928.
5. During this period of inaction, execution of the judgment had already issued, and the petitioner’s property had been sold at public auction.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for a writ of mandamus should be granted despite the petitioner’s unreasonable delay in filing it.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition.

The Court held that the petitioner was guilty of laches. Section 499 of the Code of Civil Procedure required the application for mandamus to be made “at the next term of the Supreme Court.” While the Court noted that terms of court were loosely observed, the rules indicated the second Monday of July as the start of a term. Even under the most liberal calculation, the petitioner’s filing on September 3, 1928, was unreasonably late, coming over a month after the July term began.

The Court emphasized that laches is a valid ground for denying a writ of mandamus. The delay of approximately half a year from the last action in the lower court (March 2, 1928) to the filing of the petition (September 3, 1928) was inexcusable. The Court suggested that, by analogy, the delay should not exceed the longest period (30 days) allowed for taking action in the lower court. Furthermore, the Court found that the petitioner’s inaction had allowed the judgment to be executed, resulting in the sale of her property, which prejudiced the rights of the adverse party and underscored the lack of diligence. The Supreme Court thus exercised its sound discretion to deny the writ.