G.R. No. L-30026, January 30, 1971
Mario Gumabon, Blas Bagolbagol, Gaudencio Agapito, Epifanio Padua and Paterno Palmares, petitioners, vs. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioners were convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and other offenses, with their convictions becoming final between 1953 and 1955. They had each served over thirteen years of imprisonment. Subsequently, in the 1956 case of People v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court ruled that rebellion, being a continuing offense, cannot be complexed with common crimes like murder; such common crimes are deemed absorbed by the rebellion. This doctrine was later reaffirmed in People v. Lava. However, the Hernandez ruling was promulgated after the petitioners’ convictions had attained finality.
In a prior similar case, Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons, the Court denied a habeas corpus petition, holding that the Hernandez doctrine could not be applied retroactively to invalidate a final judgment. In this new petition, the petitioners, through counsel Jose W. Diokno, sought a re-examination of Pomeroy. They argued that their continued detention constituted a denial of equal protection, as others convicted solely of simple rebellion were subject to a lower maximum penalty. They further invoked Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for the retroactive application of penal laws if favorable to the accused, contending that judicial decisions declaring acts not punishable form part of the legal system and should be given retroactive effect.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of habeas corpus is available to secure the release of petitioners who are serving final sentences for the complex crime of rebellion with murder, which was subsequently declared non-existent in jurisprudence.

RULING

Yes, the writ of habeas corpus is granted, and petitioners are ordered released. The Court resolved the petition without expressly overruling Pomeroy, as the present case raised constitutional and statutory arguments not squarely presented in the earlier decision.
The Court held that the writ of habeas corpus extends to instances where a person continues to be detained without a lawful cause, even under a final judgment. If the penalty being served exceeds the maximum period permissible by law, the detention becomes illegal. The Hernandez doctrine, which holds that rebellion cannot be complexed, is favorable to the accused. Under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, penal laws shall be given retroactive effect if they are favorable to the accused, even if a final sentence is being served. Judicial decisions that define crimes and penalties form part of the legal system; thus, the Hernandez ruling qualifies as a “penal law” for purposes of retroactive application under Article 22.
Furthermore, to deny petitioners the benefit of the Hernandez ruling while it is available to others would violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Their continued imprisonment for a complex crime declared non-existent meant they were serving a penalty for an offense that, in law, they did not commit. Consequently, they had already served more than the maximum penalty for simple rebellion. Their detention was therefore without legal justification, warranting the issuance of the writ of liberty.