GR 30005; (June, 1973) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-30005 June 19, 1973
AMADOR E. GOMEZ, petitioner, vs. JOSE S. AMADORA as City Fiscal of Cebu City, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Amador E. Gomez, a Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain respondent City Fiscal Jose S. Amadora from conducting a preliminary investigation on charges of falsification of public documents filed against him by Atty. Vicente del Rosario. The petitioner alleged that the charges were retaliatory, filed by a group angered by his contempt proceedings against a provincial warden and his conviction of a defendant in a murder case. He contended that a fair investigation was impossible in an atmosphere of intimidation and that the respondent, due to prior associations with this group, was under pressure and could not act impartially. The Secretary of Justice had issued Administrative Order No. 181, designating another fiscal to conduct the investigation, and later Order No. 324, directing the Solicitor General to conduct an administrative inquiry. Despite these directives, the respondent Fiscal insisted on proceeding with his own preliminary investigation, prompting the Supreme Court to issue a restraining order.
Subsequently, a libel charge was also filed against the petitioner by the same complainant, stemming from the judge’s statements in a court order, leading to a supplemental petition. However, the complainants later filed letters of desistance, requesting the dismissal of both the falsification and libel complaints. The respondent City Fiscal accordingly dismissed the charges on May 16, 1972, and October 17, 1972. Consequently, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the Supreme Court case as moot and academic.
ISSUE
Whether the petition for prohibition has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of the underlying criminal complaints.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the case as moot and academic. The legal logic is grounded in the principle that courts will not determine questions that no longer present a justiciable controversy. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled, and any judicial declaration would be of no practical use or value. The primary objective of the petition for prohibition was to enjoin the respondent City Fiscal from conducting the preliminary investigations. Since the respondent, acting on the requests of the complainants themselves, had already dismissed the very criminal complaints that were the subject of the intended investigations, the factual basis for the petition ceased to exist. The act sought to be prohibited—the preliminary investigation—was rendered impossible by the dismissal of the charges. Therefore, any ruling from the Court on the propriety of the respondent’s insistence to investigate, or on the alleged bias, would be an advisory opinion on a terminated matter. The dismissal of the criminal complaints extinguished the live controversy, leaving nothing for the Court to adjudicate.
