G.R. No. L-29826 September 30, 1976
Ismael Andaya, Mila Aquino and Chua To, petitioners, vs. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte and First Assistant Provincial Fiscal Carlo H. Lozada, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Ismael Andaya, Mila Aquino, and Chua To filed a petition for prohibition to restrain the respondent fiscals from conducting a preliminary investigation against them for the crime of falsification of a public document. They argued that a prejudicial question existed, constituting a legal bar to the criminal proceeding. This claim was based on a pending civil suit for breach of contract with damages which they had filed against Domingo R. Alverez, the very complainant in the falsification charge. In that civil case, Alverez, as defendant, alleged that the document forming the basis of the contract was a forgery, directly placing the authenticity of the document in issue in both proceedings.
The petitioners further noted that the falsification complaint had been previously dismissed by a justice of the peace but was subsequently refiled with the office of the Provincial Fiscal. They also raised a specific objection against First Assistant Provincial Fiscal Carlo H. Lozada, arguing it would be improper for him to conduct the investigation since he had previously appeared for the prosecution when the same case was pending before the municipal court.

ISSUE

Whether a prejudicial question may be raised to stop a preliminary investigation being conducted by a fiscal.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The legal logic is clear and categorical: a prejudicial question cannot be invoked during the preliminary investigation stage before the fiscal. The Court, citing Dasalla v. City Attorney of Quezon City and later reaffirmed in Estrella v. Orendain, Jr., held that the proper time to raise a prejudicial question is only after the fiscal has concluded the investigation and filed the corresponding information in court. The fiscal’s office is not the proper forum to resolve such questions; that function belongs to the trial court. The earlier case of De Leon v. Mabanag, which suggested otherwise, was deemed overruled by these subsequent rulings. Therefore, the petitioners’ attempt to halt the preliminary investigation on this ground was premature.
Regarding the previous dismissal by the municipal court, the Court ruled this was no obstacle. Following People v. Pervez, a dismissal at that level leaves the case as if no charge had been made, allowing the provincial fiscal full authority to conduct his own independent preliminary investigation. Finally, the Court addressed the concern over Fiscal Lozada’s impartiality. While dismissing the main petition, it recognized the principle that a fiscal conducting a quasi-judicial investigation must act with the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” (Gutierrez v. Santos). To avoid any appearance of bias, given his prior role as prosecutor in the same dismissed case, the Court directed that the preliminary investigation be assigned to any fiscal other than respondent Lozada. The restraining order was lifted.