G.R. No. L-29707 March 30, 1970
PETRONILO L. RUIZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. GERMANICO A. CARREON, and VENUSTO C. HAMOY, respondents-appellants.

FACTS

Petitioner Petronilo L. Ruiz was appointed Chief of Police of Dapitan City by the President, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. 3811 (the Dapitan City Charter), and assumed office on March 16, 1966. On August 6, 1968, an information for “other light threats” was filed against him in the City Court. Respondent City Mayor Germanico A. Carreon issued an order suspending Ruiz effective August 7, 1968, and designated respondent Venusto C. Hamoy as Officer-In-Charge of the Police Department. Ruiz filed a quo warranto proceeding, arguing that Mayor Carreon had no authority to suspend him, a presidential appointee, and that Hamoy was usurping his office. Respondents contended that the Mayor had suspension power under the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act No. 4864). The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte ruled in favor of Ruiz, nullifying the suspension order, declaring him entitled to his office, and ordering his immediate reinstatement with back salaries and emoluments. Respondents appealed.

ISSUE

Whether respondent City Mayor had the authority to suspend petitioner, a Chief of Police appointed by the President, after the enactment of Republic Act No. 4864 (Police Act of 1966) and Republic Act No. 5185 (Decentralization Act of 1967), which transferred the power to appoint chiefs of police to the City Mayor.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. Petitioner, as a presidential appointee, could only be suspended or removed for cause by order of the President. The Court held that although Republic Act No. 4864 and Republic Act No. 5185 transferred the power to appoint the Chief of Police of Dapitan City from the President to the City Mayor effective January 1, 1968, and September 12, 1967, respectively, these laws did not affect the tenure and removal safeguards of incumbent presidential appointees. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 4864 explicitly provided that its provisions were “without prejudice to the tenure of the incumbent chiefs of police… and those holding office on January 1, 1968 in accordance with existing laws,” who could only be removed for cause. Furthermore, Section 3 of Rule XIII of the Police Manual, issued by the Police Commission (the agency created to administer the Police Act), officially interpreted the Act to mean that chiefs of police appointed by the President “shall continue to enjoy their status as presidential appointees and may be suspended or removed only for cause and by order of the President.” This interpretation was entitled to great weight and was not clearly erroneous. The Court also noted that allowing a city mayor to suspend a presidential appointee would be inconsistent with the President’s constitutional power of general supervision over local governments and could enable politically motivated suspensions. The circumstances of the criminal case filed against Ruiz suggested an underlying purpose to justify his suspension. Therefore, the suspension order by Mayor Carreon was null and void.