G.R. No. 29562, July 30, 1928
BEHN, MEYER & CO., H. MIJ., plaintiff, vs. CARL ANTHOLTZ, defendant.

FACTS

The defendant, Carl Antholtz, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila to sign and certify his bill of exceptions in an ordinary civil action. Judgment was rendered against Antholtz on December 31, 1927. He filed a motion for a new trial on January 26, 1928, which was denied on February 14, 1928. The trial judge found that Antholtz filed his exception and notice of appeal, along with the bill of exceptions, on February 23, 1928nine days after receiving notice of the denial of his motion for new trial, but beyond the five-day period for filing a notice of intention to appeal as stated in *Layda v. Legazpi*.

ISSUE

Whether the filing of a bill of exceptions within ten days from notice of the denial of a motion for new trial, without a prior separate notice of intention to appeal filed within five days, constitutes sufficient compliance with procedural requirements to perfect an appeal.

RULING

YES. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus, directing the trial judge to sign and certify the bill of exceptions.

The Court clarified the rules in *Layda v. Legazpi*. While *Layda* prescribed a five-day period to file a notice of intention to appeal after denial of a motion for new trial, the Court held that the presentation of the bill of exceptions itself within ten days from such notice is tantamount to an announcement of the intention to appeal and substantially fulfills the law’s requirements. This interpretation aligns with the spirit of the law to facilitate appeals and avoid technicalities that obstruct justice. Since Antholtz filed his bill of exceptions within the ten-day period (using only nine days), his appeal was perfected.

Furthermore, the Court addressed the related issue of whether the delay in excepting to the denial of the motion for new trial (nine days) forfeited the right to have the Supreme Court review the evidence. The term “forthwith” in the Code of Civil Procedure for taking exceptions is elastic and means within a reasonable time. Under the circumstances, nine days was considered reasonable. Thus, the appellant retained the right to raise questions of fact on appeal.

The Court emphasized the need for legislative amendment to simplify and clarify appellate procedure.