G.R. No. 29147 , November 21, 1928
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DELFIN PARCASIO, ET AL., defendants. DELFIN PARCASIO, appellant.

FACTS

On the night of August 27, 1927, appellant Delfin Parcasio visited Antonina Ojida at her house in Abuyog, Leyte. The deceased, Romualdo Bitangjol, also arrived. After a brief interaction where Bitangjol laughed at Parcasio’s request for Antonina to sing, both men left the house. They later met near a cockpit, where Bitangjol was found dead. An anonymous letter led authorities to a blood-stained dagger bearing the initials “D.P.” near the crime scene. Leon Ojida testified that he saw Parcasio stab the deceased with that dagger, which Parcasio usually carried. The defense presented witnesses claiming another person, Serapio de Paz, was the attacker, but the trial court found these witnesses not credible as they had previously declared they knew nothing about the incident during the initial investigation.

The Court of First Instance of Leyte convicted Parcasio of homicide and imposed the maximum penalty of *reclusion temporal*, considering the use of a dagger as an aggravating circumstance under Article 10(24) of the Penal Code (use of a prohibited arm).

ISSUE

Whether the use of a dagger constitutes the aggravating circumstance of employing a prohibited arm under Article 10(24) of the Penal Code.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty. A dagger is not *per se* a prohibited arm. It becomes a prohibited arm only when carried concealed, as defined by Act No. 1780 . The prosecution did not prove that Parcasio concealed the dagger before the aggression. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the mere act of carrying a concealed dagger is itself a distinct crime punished by a special law ( Act No. 1780 ). Under Article 78 of the Penal Code, a circumstance that constitutes a crime specifically penalized by law cannot be used to increase the penalty for another crime in which it was present.

Therefore, the aggravating circumstance was improperly applied. The penalty should be imposed in its medium period. The Supreme Court modified the sentence to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of *reclusion temporal*. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects.