G.R. No. L-28975 February 27, 1976
Venancia B. Magay, assisted by her husband, Victoriano R. Magay, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Eugenio L. Estiandan, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellee Venancia B. Magay, the registered owner of a parcel of land under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004, filed an accion publiciana against defendant-appellant Eugenio L. Estiandan to recover possession of the property. The title was derived from a deed of sale executed by her mother-in-law, Soledad de los Reyes, whose Original Certificate of Title No. E-2020 was cancelled to issue TCT No. 2004. The appellee had formally demanded that the appellant vacate the premises, but he refused. The appellant had constructed two houses on the land.
The appellant defended his possession by claiming he had a pending miscellaneous sales application for the land with the Bureau of Lands. He further challenged the validity of the appellee’s torrens title, alleging that the original title issued to de los Reyes was fraudulently obtained. He argued that a prior judicial decision had adjudicated the land in favor of the government, implying it was public domain.

ISSUE

The principal issue is whether the appellant, a mere occupant, can collaterally attack the validity of the appellee’s torrens certificate of title in this accion publiciana.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the appellee. The Court held that a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of a certificate of title can only be questioned in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The appellant’s defense, which alleged fraud in the issuance of the original title, constitutes an impermissible collateral attack. The proper remedy, if the title was indeed fraudulently secured, is a direct proceeding for its nullification.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that even assuming the land was part of the public domain, the appellant is not the proper party to seek its reversion to the state. Only the Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, can institute such a reversion proceeding. The appellant’s pending sales application does not vest him with any vested right superior to a registered owner’s title. The Court also found no merit in the jurisdictional challenge, noting that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, which properly alleged an accion publiciana for recovery of possession. Therefore, the appellant was ordered to vacate the land and pay rentals and attorney’s fees.