G.R. No. L-28671 September 30, 1970
JOSE, MACARIA, CRISANTA, PURIFICACION, JUANITO, MANUEL, TERESITA, BENJAMIN, MERCEDITAS, DANIEL, MIGUEL, DOLORES, CONCEPCION, RICARDO, all surnamed UYTIEPO; LETICIA, PEDRO, HECTOR, all surnamed GAMBOA and FE JEREZA, petitioners, vs. MICAMA AGGABAO and the HON COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Micaela Aggabao, a judgment creditor, caused the sale at public auction of properties purportedly belonging to her judgment debtor, Manuel Uytiepo, et al. Petitioners Jose Uytiepo, et al., filed third-party claims to the levied properties. Due to an indemnity bond posted by Aggabao, the sheriff proceeded with the auction sale, where Aggabao was the successful bidder. Petitioners then filed a suit in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (civil case 4582) to annul the sheriff’s sale. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the sale of some properties valid, others null and void, ordering Manuel Uytiepo, Jr. to transfer a portion of a lot to petitioners, declaring the sale of sugar quota allocations and a tractor illegal, condemning Manuel Uytiepo, Jr. to pay damages, and ordering Aggabao to account for profits from the sugar quotas. On Aggabao’s appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications: vacating the judgment regarding two lots and remanding for determination of registered ownership; modifying damages; confirming the sale of a portion of the sugar quotas; ordering Aggabao to pay monthly rental for the tractor; and affirming the judgment in all other respects. Aggabao’s subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court (L-25241) was unavailing.
On January 21, 1967, upon petitioners’ motion, the trial court issued a writ of execution covering the final judgment. The sheriff levied upon five lots adjudicated to Aggabao but in petitioners’ possession, to satisfy the money judgment in petitioners’ favor. Aggabao filed a motion praying for a writ of possession for the lots adjudicated to her, determination of ownership of the two remanded lots, and suspension of execution until her liability for the tractor was fixed, alleging she had sold the tractor prior to litigation. The trial court did not act on this motion. The sheriff set an auction sale of the levied lots for August 18, 1967. Aggabao moved to suspend the sale pending resolution of her earlier motion. The trial court, in its order of August 4, 1967, refused to recall the writ. Aggabao filed a motion for reconsideration with an offer to post a bond. On August 15, 1967, Aggabao filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals to stop the sale. The trial court suspended the sale upon being informed an injunction was forthcoming. On December 12, 1967, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the trial court’s order of August 4, 1967, staying the sheriff’s sale pending determination of Aggabao’s rental liability for the tractor and its value if return was unfeasible, and directing the trial court to issue a writ of possession in favor of Aggabao for the lots adjudged to her. Petitioners appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to issue the auxiliary writs of certiorari and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction after the decision had become final and executory.
2. Whether the issues raised by Aggabao involved only questions of law, thus falling under the exclusive review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
3. Whether the trial court’s order of execution varied the terms of the final judgment.
4. Whether the Court of Appeals properly ordered the suspension of the execution sale and the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Aggabao.

RULING

1. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction. While no appeal generally lies from an order of execution of a final judgment, an appeal can be invoked when the execution varies the terms of the judgment or when the terms are not entirely clear and the trial court’s interpretation in its order of execution is wrong. Here, the execution proceeding raised the issue of whether the order of execution varied the essence of the final judgment. Aggabao’s objection to the order of execution, founded on facts claimed to render literal execution unjust, necessitated appreciation of evidence and raised a factual issue regarding the tractor’s value. An intended appeal from the execution proceeding would be lodged with the Court of Appeals. Aggabao properly chose to apply for certiorari and mandamus in the absence of a plain, adequate, and speedy remedy to correct alleged jurisdictional errors.
2. The issues did not involve only questions of law. Petitioners confused the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 (available in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction) with an appeal by certiorari under Rule 42 (exclusively reviewable by the Supreme Court on questions of law). Aggabao’s petition fell under the former.
3. The trial court’s order of execution did not vary the terms of the final judgment. The Court of Appeals’ decision did not order the return of the tractor but required Aggabao to pay a monthly rental for its use. The trial court’s order of execution, directing payment of the rental from October 18, 1957, until the tractor’s return, was in conformity with the appellate court’s judgment. However, since Aggabao claimed she had sold the tractor before litigation and its return was unfeasible, the trial court should first determine its value as of January 27, 1967 (the date of her motion), after deducting reasonable depreciation, and order Aggabao to pay that value plus the monthly rental from October 18, 1957, to January 27, 1967.
4. The Court of Appeals properly ordered the suspension of the execution sale and the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioners were not deprived of their right to execute upon Aggabao’s properties; execution could proceed once the trial court fixed her liability for the tractor. Petitioners’ insistence that they could not be compelled to yield the lots adjudicated to Aggabao until she satisfied the money judgment was without basis, as no rule or statute granted them a possessory lien over the debtor’s properties. Aggabao’s money obligation was a compensation for damages from an unjustified sheriff’s sale, while her right to possession of the lots sprang from ownership established by final judgment, with no direct relation between the obligation and the land to warrant a possessory lien.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment with the modification that the trial court determine the tractor’s value as of January 27, 1967, after deducting reasonable depreciation, and order Aggabao to pay that value plus P200 per month from October 18, 1957, to January 27, 1967.