GR 28638; (September, 1928) (Digest)

G.R. No. 28638, September 21, 1928
ROSARIO ESLER, VDA. DE TAD-Y, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE B. LEDESMA, Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, NICOLAS VALENCIA and MATEO VILLAVERT, Clerk of Court of First Instance of Iloilo, defendants-appellees.

DOCTRINE:
Under Section 74 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (General Orders No. 58), a cash deposit made in lieu of bail for the provisional liberty of an accused may be applied only to the payment of the fine and costs imposed in the judgment. It cannot be applied to satisfy the civil indemnity awarded to the offended party, even if the deposit was furnished by a third person. The right of the government to the deposit is in the nature of a lien limited to the fine and costs.

FACTS

1. Mariano Gotera was charged with serious physical injuries against Fr. Nicolas Valencia. To secure his provisional liberty, two Liberty Bonds were deposited with the Clerk of Court, Mateo Villavert, in lieu of a cash bail bond.
2. A receipt was issued by the clerk, and appended to it was a declaration signed by Gotera stating that the bonds were the exclusive property of Rosario Esler, Vda. de Tad-Y (plaintiff-appellant), and that he had no interest in them.
3. Gotera was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, ordered to indemnify Fr. Valencia in the sum of P2,996, and to pay costs.
4. The trial court, upon Fr. Valencia’s motion, ordered the Clerk of Court to apply the proceeds of the Liberty Bonds (which were converted to cash) to the payment of the indemnity. After deducting fees, the balance of P1,923.30 was given to Fr. Valencia.
5. Mrs. Tad-Y filed an action to recover the amount, claiming ownership of the bonds. The trial court dismissed her complaint, finding that the bonds belonged to Gotera, not to her.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Liberty Bonds deposited for Gotera’s provisional liberty were owned by the plaintiff-appellant, Rosario Esler, Vda. de Tad-Y.
2. Whether the proceeds of the deposit (Liberty Bonds) could legally be applied to satisfy the civil indemnity awarded to the offended party in the criminal case.

RULING

1. On the Issue of Ownership: The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s finding. Based on the evidenceincluding the plaintiff’s testimony, corroborating witnesses, the partition of her late husband’s estate showing she received similar bonds, and most importantly, the written declaration signed by Gotera on the receipt itselfthe Court held that the Liberty Bonds were indeed the property of Mrs. Tad-Y, not of the accused Gotera.

2. On the Main Issue of Application of the Deposit: The Supreme Court ruled that the proceeds of the deposit could NOT be applied to the civil indemnity.

* The Court interpreted Section 74 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that a cash deposit in lieu of bail “shall be applied to the payment of the fine and costs for which judgment may be given, and the surplus, if any, shall be returned to the defendant.”
* The Court drew a clear distinction: a cash deposit under this provision answers only for obligations in which the State has a direct interestthe fine (a pecuniary punishment to the government) and costs (of the proceedings).
* The indemnity awarded to the offended party, while determined in the criminal action, is essentially a civil liability arising from the crime. It is primarily of interest to the offended party and the accused, not the State.
* Therefore, the government’s lien on the cash deposit extends only to the fine and costs. The law does not authorize its application to the indemnity. To do so would be to amend the law by judicial fiat.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The judgment appealed from is REVERSED. The trial court is ordered to render a new judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Rosario Esler, Vda. de Tad-Y, and against defendant Nicolas Valencia for the sum of P1,923.30. No costs awarded.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
* Justice Street (Concurring): Agreed that the bonds could not be applied to the indemnity. Reserved his view on whether they could be applied to a fine.
* Justice Romualdez (Dissenting): Believed that: (1) since Mrs. Tad-Y did not intend to give her bonds as bail, they should not be forfeited; and (2) the term “fine” in Section 74 should be construed to include indemnity to the offended party.