G.R. No. 28320, September 20, 1927
RUFO SAN JUAN, petitioner-appellee, vs. PERFECTO ABORDO, respondent-appellant.

FACTS

1. In the June 2, 1925 elections for Provincial Governor of Palawan, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Perfecto Abordo as the elected governor, having received 1,444 votes against Rufo San Juan’s 1,406 votes.
2. On July 1, 1925, San Juan filed an election protest in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Palawan. Abordo filed a counter-protest.
3. During the pendency of the judicial protest, San Juan also initiated an administrative protest with the Executive Bureau, challenging Abordo’s eligibility on the ground of lack of legal residence in Palawan at the time of the election.
4. The administrative proceedings, conducted under Section 408 of the Election Law, resulted in Proclamation No. 48, series of 1926, issued by Governor-General Leonard Wood on October 18, 1926. The proclamation declared Abordo ineligible for the office of provincial governor due to lack of required residence and, consequently, declared the office vacant.
5. Despite this proclamation, the CFI proceeded with the election contest and, on March 27, 1927, rendered a decision declaring that San Juan obtained 1,340 valid votes and Abordo 1,067 votes. The court also declared Abordo ineligible.
6. Abordo appealed the CFI decision to the Supreme Court.
7. San Juan moved to dismiss the appeal on three grounds: (a) the appeal was filed out of time; (b) Abordo had already been declared ineligible and the office declared vacant by the Governor-General’s proclamation; and (c) Abordo was not a registered candidate and was thus ineligible.

ISSUE

Whether the appeal filed by Perfecto Abordo in the Supreme Court should be dismissed in light of the Governor-General’s proclamation declaring him ineligible for the office of provincial governor and the office vacant.

RULING

YES, the appeal is dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that the Governor-General’s proclamation under Section 408 of the Election Law, which declared Abordo ineligible and the office vacant, rendered the appeal moot and futile.

1. The proclamation precludes any effective relief for Abordo. Even if the Supreme Court were to review the ballots and find that Abordo obtained more votes than San Juan, such a judgment would be impossible to execute because Abordo had already been authoritatively declared ineligible to hold the office. The same would hold true if the election were declared a tie.

2. The courts lack jurisdiction over questions of eligibility in election contests. Following the doctrine in *Topacio v. Paredes* (23 Phil. 238), the resolution of eligibility for provincial elective offices is vested by law in the executive department, not the judiciary. The courts’ authority in election contests is limited to determining the true will of the electorate (i.e., who obtained the plurality of legal votes), not the qualifications of the candidates. Therefore, Abordo could not raise the issue of San Juan’s eligibility on appeal, nor could the court rule on his own eligibility.

3. Public policy favors the speedy resolution of election contests. The law mandates that election contests be decided promptly to end uncertainty, quell political strife, and restore political repose in the community. Allowing an appeal that could yield no practical result would contravene this policy and waste the resources of the court and the parties.

Given that the second ground for dismissal (the Governor-General’s proclamation) was dispositive, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to discuss the other grounds raised by San Juan (untimeliness of appeal and non-registration).

The appeal was DISMISSED, with costs against appellant Perfecto Abordo.