G.R. No. L-28251 July 13, 1973
ESTEBAN G. HERNAEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANDRES MAMALIO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellee Esteban G. Hernaez was granted a homestead patent, and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1270 was issued in his name on October 11, 1950. On July 14, 1955, he sold a portion of this homestead to defendant-appellant Andres Mamalio. On January 2, 1960, Hernaez filed a complaint to repurchase the land, invoking his right under Section 119 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141), as the sale occurred within five years from the issuance of the title. In the alternative, he claimed the sale was null and void for lack of approval from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Mamalio moved to dismiss the alternative cause of action, arguing that only the Secretary, not the homesteader, could sue to annul a sale for lack of approval. The trial court denied the motion, sustaining the primary action for repurchase. In his answer, Mamalio alleged Hernaez’s true motive was to demand more money due to land value appreciation and that Hernaez was not financially ready to repurchase. During the pre-trial on July 28, 1964, Mamalio and his counsel failed to appear despite notice.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the trial court correctly granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee, ordering the reconveyance of the homestead land upon repurchase.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court clarified that the lower court’s decision was more accurately a judgment on the pleadings under the circumstances, not a summary judgment. Mamalio’s failure to appear at the pre-trial without justifiable cause, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, warranted this disposition.
The Court held that the factual issues raised by Mamalio in his answer were immaterial and sham. In an action to enforce the statutory right to repurchase a homestead within five years from its sale, the plaintiff’s underlying motive is legally inconsequential. Furthermore, a court need not preemptively inquire into the plaintiff’s financial capacity to repurchase. This question is resolved by the plaintiff’s actual tender or deposit of the repurchase price within the period set by the court. Hernaez’s primary cause of action under Section 119 of the Public Land Act was valid and properly alleged. The Court found no denial of due process, as Mamalio was given opportunity to be heard but defaulted. Consequently, the order for reconveyance upon tender of the original selling price of P4,375.00 was upheld.