G.R. No. L-28241 August 6, 1971
ONOFRE P. GUEVARRA, petitioner, vs. JUSTINO HERMOSO, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MALOLOS, BULACAN, AND THE EX-OFFICIO PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF MALOLOS, BULACAN, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Onofre P. Guevarra sought certiorari to annul a final judgment by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 2187, which declared private respondent Justino Hermoso the absolute owner of a parcel of land (Lot 567-A) and ordered Guevarra to vacate and pay attorney’s fees. Guevarra alleged the judgment was rendered after an ex-parte hearing, claiming the court arbitrarily denied his counsel’s telegraphic request for postponement. He further asserted the decision was based solely on Hermoso’s uncorroborated testimony and that he was never served a copy, learning of it only upon the issuance of a writ of execution and demolition, thus precluding an ordinary appeal.
The respondents’ answer and memoranda presented a contrasting narrative. The record indicated multiple postponements were granted to both parties for valid reasons, including settlement negotiations and Guevarra’s own motions. For the hearing on August 20, 1963, neither Guevarra nor his counsel appeared. The court designated its clerk to receive Hermoso’s evidence. The alleged telegraphic request for postponement was not mentioned in the court’s order or decision, and no copy was submitted by Guevarra. Contrary to his claim, the decision was based on documentary evidence tracing Hermoso’s chain of title. Furthermore, it was established that a copy of the decision was served on Guevarra by registered mail at his law office on September 6, 1963, and a motion for execution was personally served on him at his office in December 1965, yet he took no action.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of certiorari is a proper remedy to set aside the final judgment and restrain its execution.

RULING

No. The petition for certiorari is dismissed. The Supreme Court held that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Guevarra failed to avail himself of adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. He could have moved for reconsideration, sought a new trial, filed a petition for relief from judgment, or appealed. His inaction for over four years after the judgment and after being served the motion for execution constitutes laches. The issues he raised—such as the denial of the postponement and the correctness of the judgment—pertain to errors of law, not jurisdictional errors. Certiorari lies only for lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, which Guevarra failed to demonstrate. The respondent court’s judgment was supported by evidence and rendered in accordance with procedure. Consequently, the preliminary injunction was dissolved.