G.R. No. L-28203. January 22, 1971.
ELEUTERIO BACARRO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division), THE HONORABLE BERNARDO TEVES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, 15th Judicial District, Branch IV, and VIVENCIA VELEZ VDA. DE GAERLAN, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Eleuterio Bacarro filed a complaint for annulment of a deed of reconveyance over a portion of his registered lot, which he claimed was executed under duress before a municipal judge. Respondent Vivencia Velez Vda. de Gaerlan, in her answer, asserted the deed was voluntary. The trial court, upon respondent’s manifestation, ordered petitioner to amend his complaint within ten days, warning of dismissal for non-compliance. Petitioner failed to amend, leading the trial judge to dismiss the complaint and the respondent’s counterclaim.
Petitioner, through a new counsel, Atty. Alfredo C. Caballero, filed a motion for reconsideration, stating he had “duly relieved his previous counsel,” Atty. Tommy C. Pacana. The motion was denied on November 14, 1966, and notice was served on Atty. Pacana. Atty. Caballero received notice only on March 15, 1967, and immediately filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal. Respondent opposed the appeal, arguing the period to appeal should be reckoned from the November 14, 1966, notice to Atty. Pacana, making the appeal filed on March 15, 1967, out of time. The trial court agreed and disapproved the record on appeal. The Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed petitioner’s certiorari petition, upholding the trial court’s computation of the appeal period.

ISSUE

Whether the period for perfecting an appeal should be computed from the service of the order denying the motion for reconsideration upon the original counsel of record, despite a clear statement in the motion that said counsel had been duly relieved by the client.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and annulled the trial court’s orders. The legal logic centers on the client’s absolute right to dismiss counsel at any time. The Court held that the period to appeal should be computed from the date the new counsel of record received notice of the order. The pivotal fact was the explicit declaration in the motion for reconsideration that the previous counsel had been “duly relieved.” This constituted a valid dismissal of the original attorney. The Court reasoned that a client is not required to formally file a separate substitution of counsel or prove the original counsel’s consent for the dismissal to be effective. The act of hiring a new lawyer who files a pleading stating the old counsel has been relieved is a sufficient manifestation of the client’s will to terminate the prior representation.
The Court distinguished the cited case of Bello v. Fernando, where the period ran from notice to the original counsel, because in that case there was no showing the client had dispensed with the original counsel’s services. Here, the motion itself provided that showing. The Court further analogized to Rustia v. Judge of First Instance, where a client’s personal appearance to compromise a case was held to be an implied dismissal of their lawyer. Consequently, a fortiori, an express statement in a formal pleading that counsel was “duly relieved” is a more explicit act of dismissal. Therefore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the record on appeal based on an incorrect computation, and the Court of Appeals erred in upholding it. The trial court was directed to give due course to the appeal.