G.R. No. L-28069 August 18, 1977
PAULA MANDURIAO, petitioner-appellant, vs. ROQUE HABANA, JUANITO DAYSON and GLORIA SERRANO, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

On February 24, 1962, the acting chief of police of Bacon, Sorsogon, filed a complaint in the justice of the peace court against Paula Manduriao for “grave slander with slight physical injuries,” alleging she uttered defamatory words against Gloria Serrano and boxed her on February 21, 1962. After Manduriao waived preliminary investigation, the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance (CFI). The fiscal, noting the complaint should be for slander under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code and that there is no single offense of “grave slander with lesiones leves,” moved to dismiss the grave slander charge without prejudice and to remand the case for prosecution of lesiones leves only. The CFI granted this motion on July 20, 1962.
Upon the record’s return to the inferior court, the chief of police filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1962, charging lesiones leves only. Manduriao moved to quash, arguing the offense had prescribed, but the court denied her motion. She then filed a petition for prohibition in the CFI to restrain the trial, reiterating her prescription claim. The lower court dismissed her petition, ruling the amended complaint related back to the original filing, thus interrupting prescription.

ISSUE

Whether the offense of lesiones leves had prescribed, thereby barring prosecution.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal, holding the offense had not prescribed. The legal logic centers on the interruption of the prescriptive period under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. For light offenses like lesiones leves, prescription is two months under Article 90. However, Article 91 provides that this period is interrupted by the filing of the complaint and commences to run again only when proceedings terminate without conviction or acquittal, or are unjustifiably stopped for reasons not imputable to the accused.
Here, the original complaint for “grave slander with slight physical injuries” was filed on February 24, 1962, merely three days after the alleged incident on February 21. This filing effectively interrupted the sixty-day prescriptive period. The subsequent amendment of the complaint to charge solely lesiones leves, following the CFI’s order, was a valid implementation of that order and did not constitute a termination of proceedings that would restart the prescriptive clock. The amended complaint related back to the date of the original filing, as held in the analogous case of Arcaya vs. Teleron. The Court rejected Manduriao’s argument that the initial case became “non-existent” after dismissal by the CFI, noting the dismissal was explicitly without prejudice as to the lesiones leves charge and the case was remanded for trial. Thus, the interruption of prescription continued, and prosecution was not barred. The municipal court was directed to proceed with the trial.