GR 28066; (September, 1976) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-28066 September 22, 1976
PEREGRINA ASTUDILLO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION, RAMON P. MITRA, SALUD O. MITRA, and REGISTER OF DEEDS, QUEZON CITY, respondents-appellees.
FACTS
Peregrina Astudillo, a squatter who had occupied Lot 16 in Quezon City since 1957, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus after Ramon P. Mitra was awarded the lot by the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC). Mitra had applied for the lot in 1957 on behalf of his minor son, completed payments, and received a title in 1965. Astudillo, who had built a house on the lot, requested the PHHC to cancel Mitra’s award and re-award the lot to her. When the PHHC took no action, she sued, questioning the award’s legality and seeking to compel its sale to her. The lower court treated the Mitras’ motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss and granted it, prompting Astudillo’s appeal.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether Astudillo, as a squatter, possesses a valid cause of action to annul the sale of the lot to Mitra and to compel the PHHC to award the lot to her instead.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Astudillo had no cause of action. As a squatter without any possessory or legal rights to the lot, she suffered no legal prejudice from its award to Mitra. The Court emphasized that a squatter, lacking any right enforceable in court, cannot sue for the protection of a non-existent right or for the annulment of a contract to which she is not a party. The special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus were also deemed improper remedies. Certiorari does not lie because the PHHC board took no actionable decision against her, and mandamus cannot be used to compel the execution of a contract of sale, which is a discretionary, not ministerial, duty. Furthermore, the Court declined to resolve Astudillo’s ancillary claim that the award violated anti-graft laws and constitutional provisions, as her lack of standing rendered her an improper party to raise such public law questions in this suit. The decision reinforces that state housing policies and social justice commitments do not legitimize squatting or confer rights upon usurpers of property.