G.R. No. L-27958 March 31, 1973
G. A. MACHINERIES, INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO JANUTO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Plaintiff G. A. Machineries, Inc. filed an action to enforce a 1958 judgment from the Court of First Instance of Manila, which ordered defendant Fernando Januto to pay a sum of money. The judgment had been partially satisfied through a prior writ of execution, under which Januto’s personal properties were levied upon and sold at public auction. The plaintiff sought to recover the remaining unpaid balance. In his answer, Januto denied liability and raised a special defense, alleging that the 1958 judgment never became effective as to him because he never personally received a copy of the decision. He claimed this lack of personal notice deprived him of his day in court, constituting a denial of due process.
The lower court rejected Januto’s defense. It found that while Januto may not have received personal notices, he was represented by counsel of record in the original case. The court emphasized that Januto’s recourse was to question the proceedings in the original Manila case, which he failed to do, even after the writ of execution was issued and his properties were sold. The court held it had no authority to inquire into the validity of the original proceedings absent a claim of want of jurisdiction, which was not raised.

ISSUE

Whether the defendant was denied due process in the original 1958 case due to alleged lack of personal notice of the trial and decision, thereby rendering the judgment unenforceable against him.

RULING

No, the defendant was not denied due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The legal logic is anchored on the settled rule that when a party is represented by counsel of record, notices of court proceedings are properly sent to said counsel, and there is no requirement for personal notification to the client. The doctrine, first established in Palad v. Cui, is that service upon the counsel is service upon the client. Januto’s attempt to circumvent this principle by alleging his counsel’s withdrawal was unavailing. The record showed his counsel’s withdrawal did not comply with the Rules of Court, which require either the client’s written consent or a court order upon notice and hearing. The withdrawal letter was not acted upon by the court; thus, the counsel remained the counsel of record, and notices sent to him were binding on Januto.
Furthermore, the Court found Januto’s defense untenable due to his failure to timely assert it. He did not object to the original proceedings or the first writ of execution, under which he partially satisfied the judgment and suffered levy and sale of his property. His belated challenge, only raised in this subsequent action for the unpaid balance, constituted an impermissible collateral attack on a final judgment. The decision had become final and executory. The Court emphasized that allowing such a challenge would be contrary to the principles of finality of judgments and orderly administration of justice. The lower court correctly refused to invalidate the prior final judgment based on an untimely claim of procedural defect that was waived by inaction. Costs were imposed on the appellant.