G.R. No. L-27950 July 29, 1971
TORIBIA LAMAGAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and COSME O. FOLLOSCO, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Respondent Cosme O. Follosco, the registered owner under Original Certificate of Title No. 178, filed an ejectment case against petitioner Toribia Lamagan and her husband. In defense, Lamagan claimed open, adverse possession since 1890 and alleged Follosco’s title was obtained through fraud, counterclaiming for reconveyance based on an implied trust. During trial, as Lamagan presented evidence, Follosco objected to questions regarding ownership, arguing his Torrens title was indefeasible. The trial court issued a resolution sustaining the objection, ruling that evidence of pre-existing rights was barred under Section 38 of Act 496, as no petition to review the decree was filed within one year. The court indicated it would only admit evidence showing a “better and earlier issued Torrens Title” in favor of Lamagan. Lamagan’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Lamagan filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it for failure to state a cause of action, noting the trial court’s ruling was interlocutory and not within the ambit of certiorari, and further opining that the counterclaim for reconveyance had prescribed. Lamagan then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the trial court’s resolution violated due process by virtually refusing to hear her defense.

ISSUE

Did the Court of Appeals commit grave error in dismissing the certiorari petition, thereby refusing to review the trial court’s interlocutory order on the admissibility of evidence?

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s dismissal. The trial court’s resolution was an interlocutory order relating to the admissibility of evidence, not a final judgment. As a general rule, such orders are not reviewable by certiorari but are to be corrected in the appeal from the final judgment. Certiorari lies only when there is a clear grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The trial court’s ruling, while potentially erroneous, did not constitute such an abuse; it was a procedural determination within its authority. The proper remedy for Lamagan was to make a formal offer of her excluded evidence after presenting her case, have it ruled upon by the trial court, and then assign any error as a ground for appeal in the eventual final judgment. This procedure allows the appellate court to review the complete record. The Court emphasized that trials should not be unduly suspended for interlocutory rulings, to avoid delay. Any error in the exclusion of evidence can be adequately rectified on appeal from the final decision.