G.R. No. L-27914 July 31, 1978
ROBERTO A. PASCUAL, petitioner, vs. HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Quezon City, The Sheriff of Quezon City and JOSE BANARIA and FELISA BANARIA, Spouses, respondents.

FACTS

The private respondents, spouses Jose and Felisa Banaria, along with the People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation, filed an ejectment case against petitioner Roberto A. Pascual. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City rendered a decision adverse to Pascual on July 25, 1966. His counsel, Atty. Teofilo Ogsimer, filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied in an order dated September 10, 1966. This order was sent by registered mail to Atty. Ogsimer, with the first registry notice received on September 22, 1966. Crucially, however, Atty. Ogsimer’s withdrawal as counsel of record had been granted by the lower court on September 20, 1966, two days prior to the receipt of the notice.
Subsequently, the trial court, deeming the decision final and executory, issued an order granting a writ of execution on January 4, 1967, and later, an order for a writ of demolition on April 22, 1967. Petitioner Pascual filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, arguing that the service of the order denying reconsideration upon an already-withdrawn counsel was invalid. He contended that such defective service prevented the decision from becoming final, rendering the issuance of the writs of execution and demolition a grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the service by registered mail of the order denying the motion for reconsideration upon petitioner’s former counsel, after his withdrawal had been granted, was valid and effective to cause the finality of the decision.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the validity of the service and the finality of the decision. The Court applied Rule 13, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, which governs service by registered mail. The rule provides that if a party or counsel does not claim the registered mail within five days from the first notice of the postmaster, service is deemed complete at the expiration of such five-day period. The records showed that the first notice was received on September 22, 1966, and the mail was never claimed. Therefore, service was deemed complete on September 27, 1966. From that date, the period to appeal resumed, and the decision became final and executory on October 28, 1966.
The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument based on his counsel’s prior withdrawal. It emphasized that the withdrawal was granted on September 20, 1966, but the motion for reconsideration—filed by that same counsel—was still pending at that time. The court’s order denying that motion was a direct consequence of the motion he filed. Service to him, as the counsel of record who initiated the pending incident, was therefore proper. To rule otherwise would allow a party to frustrate the finality of a judgment through the tactical withdrawal of counsel. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the respondent judge’s orders, as they were issued after the judgment had validly attained finality.