G.R. No. 27619 , February 4, 1928
RAUL ROGERIO GONZALEZ, by his guardian ad litem Adelaida Gonzalez, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Doña Petrolina de Guzman, in her 1816 will, directed her executor to establish a collative chaplaincy using a house she owned in Binondo, Manila. The chaplaincy was to be conferred upon her great-grandson, Esteban de Guzman, and in his default, to the nearest relative, and failing that, to an orphan mestizo collegian of San Juan de Letran. The chaplain was to say 60 masses annually for the souls of her family. The Father President of San Juan de Letran was named patron. After her death, the executor, Jose Telesforo de Guzman, petitioned the Archbishop in 1820 to create the chaplaincy and executed a formal deed of endowment, transferring the property to the spiritual properties of the Archbishopric. The chaplaincy was established, and several chaplains served until the position became vacant in 1911 upon the death of the last chaplain, Angel Gonzalez.

Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, the minor son of the last chaplain Angel Gonzalez, through his guardian (and mother) Adelaida Gonzalez, filed an action for mandamus to compel the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila to appoint him to the vacant chaplaincy. He also sought an accounting of the income from the chaplaincy property from the time it became vacant (1911) and the payment of such income to him.

The trial court granted the petition, ordering the Archbishop to appoint the plaintiff as chaplain and to pay him the accumulated net income from the property from 1911, minus legitimate expenses. The Archbishop appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the plaintiff, Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, has a clear legal right to be appointed to the vacant chaplaincy.
2. Whether mandamus is the proper remedy to compel such an ecclesiastical appointment.
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to an accounting and payment of the income from the chaplaincy property during the vacancy.

RULING

The Supreme Court REVERSED the judgment of the trial court.

1. On the Right to Appointment: The Court held that the plaintiff did not have a clear, certain, and complete legal right to the appointment. The foundation document and the will of Doña Petrolina de Guzman created a collative chaplaincy, which is an ecclesiastical benefice. The appointment to such a chaplaincy is a canonical or spiritual act vested in the discretion of the ecclesiastical authority (the Archbishop), subject to the terms of the foundation. The civil courts cannot interfere with this discretionary power or judge the qualifications of candidates for an ecclesiastical office. The plaintiff’s claim was based on being the “nearest relative,” but the determination of who qualifies as such under the terms of the foundation is a matter for the church authority to decide.

2. On the Remedy of Mandamus: The writ of mandamus lies only to compel the performance of a ministerial dutyan act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty arising from an office, trust, or station. It does not lie to control discretionary power. Since the appointment to the chaplaincy involves the exercise of discretion and judgment by the Archbishop, mandamus is not an appropriate remedy. The civil courts lack jurisdiction to issue such a writ against an ecclesiastical superior in matters of spiritual jurisdiction.

3. On the Accounting and Income: The Court ruled that the plaintiff, not being the appointed chaplain, has no right to the income of the chaplaincy. The income from the property forms the benefice attached to the office. Until a chaplain is canonically appointed and installed, no person has a right to such income. The property is held by the Archbishop as a trustee for the purposes of the foundation. Any accounting for the administration of the property during the vacancy should be rendered to the patron of the chaplaincy (the Father President of San Juan de Letran) or in an action brought by one with a proper equitable interest, not by a mere claimant to the office. The plaintiff’s action for an accounting was premature and not based on a present vested right.

DISSENTING OPINION (Justice Johns):
The dissent argued that the action could be construed as a “class suit” brought on behalf of all descendants of the foundress. It viewed the Archbishop as holding the property in trust under the terms of the will. The dissent believed that, under equitable principles, the defendant should be required to account for the income from the property, and the lower court’s judgment should be affirmed to do justice among all interested parties.

DOCTRINE:
Civil courts have no jurisdiction to interfere by mandamus with the discretionary power of ecclesiastical authorities in the appointment to church offices or benefices. Mandamus lies only to compel the performance of ministerial duties, not discretionary acts. The income of an ecclesiastical benefice belongs to the office, and a mere claimant to the office, prior to canonical appointment, has no vested right to such income.