G.R. No. 27498 , September 20, 1927
IN RE: ESTATE OF MARCELINO TONGCO, represented by JOSEFA TONGCO, administratrix, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANASTACIA VIANZON, defendant-appellee.

DOCTRINE: The statutory prohibition under Section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the “Dead Man’s Statute”), which disqualifies a party from testifying against an executor or administrator regarding matters occurring before the decedent’s death, does not apply when the action is brought *by* the estate to enforce a claim *against* the surviving party, or in special proceedings like cadastral cases where there is no strict plaintiff-defendant relationship. Furthermore, a waiver of the disqualification may occur when the adverse party cross-examines the witness on the prohibited matters.

FACTS

1. Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon were married in 1894. Marcelino died in 1925, and his niece, Josefa Tongco, was appointed administratrix of his estate.
2. Before his death, Marcelino filed claims in a cadastral case for several lots, requesting titles in the name of the conjugal partnership. Decrees and Torrens titles for these lots were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership after his death.
3. The widow, Anastacia Vianzon, filed a motion in the cadastral case to revise the decrees, claiming the lots were her exclusive property. The trial court (Judge Rovira) granted her motion, annulled the decrees, and ordered new titles to be issued in her name exclusively.
4. Subsequently, the administratrix, Josefa Tongco, filed a separate civil action against Anastacia for the recovery of the same properties and damages. The trial court (also Judge Rovira) dismissed the complaint and declared the properties as belonging exclusively to the widow.
5. The administratrix appealed both decisions. The two cases (the civil case, G.R. No. 27498 , and the cadastral case, G.R. No. 27499 ) were consolidated on appeal.
6. A key issue was the admissibility of the widow’s testimony. The administratrix argued it should be excluded under the “Dead Man’s Statute” (Sec. 383, Code of Civil Procedure), which prohibits a party from testifying against an executor about matters before the decedent’s death.

ISSUE

1. Was the testimony of the widow, Anastacia Vianzon, properly admitted by the trial court, or should it have been excluded under the “Dead Man’s Statute”?
2. Corollarily, did the trial court err in ruling that the disputed properties were the exclusive property of the widow and not part of the conjugal partnership?

RULING

1. The testimony of the widow was properly admitted.
The Supreme Court held that the disqualification under Section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to the circumstances of this case. The law prohibits testimony “against an executor or administrator… upon a claim or demand against the estate.” The Court emphasized the word “against.”
* In the civil case for recovery ( G.R. No. 27498 ), the action was brought by the administratrix (the estate) to enforce a demand against the widow. Therefore, the widow was not testifying “against” the estate; rather, the estate was asserting a claim against her.
* In the cadastral case ( G.R. No. 27499 ), it is a special proceeding without a conventional plaintiff and defendant, making the statutory prohibition inapplicable by analogy to precedents like *Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila*.
Furthermore, the Court noted that a waiver of the disqualification occurred when counsel for the administratrix cross-examined the widow on the very matters she testified to on direct examination.

2. The trial court did not err in ruling the properties belonged exclusively to the widow.
With the widow’s testimony properly admitted, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s factual findings. While Article 1407 of the Civil Code presumes property acquired during marriage to be conjugal, this presumption is rebuttable. The Court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the widow presented “decisive and conclusive” evidence to overcome this presumption and prove her exclusive ownership. The denial of the motion for a new trial was also sustained.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellant, Josefa Tongco, as administratrix.