GR 27048; (September, 1927) (CRITIQUE)
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THE AI-ASSISTED CRITIQUE
The Court’s reliance on the discretionary power of the trial court in denying the motion to set aside the default judgment is procedurally sound but substantively questionable. The defendant’s answer, filed before judgment, alleged a specific tender of rental and the exercise of the purchase option, which, if proven, constitutes a complete meritorious defense to the action for rescission based on non-payment. By dismissing the motion primarily due to the lack of a verified affidavit of merit attached to the initial pleading, the Court elevated form over substance. The subsequent filing of a verified motion with supporting affidavits, including one from the defendant himself detailing the tender, should have compelled a reassessment under the principle of Fumus Boni Juris, as it showed at least a prima facie case warranting a trial on the merits to avoid a potential miscarriage of justice.

The decision’s analytical weakness lies in its cursory treatment of the defendant’s core legal claim: the attempted exercise of the option to purchase. The lease agreement contained an option to purchase, and the defendant’s answer specifically alleged a tender of both the overdue rental and a substantial portion of the purchase price, which the plaintiff refused. By focusing narrowly on the default for non-payment and the technical insufficiency of the initial answer, the Court failed to engage with the legal effect of a simultaneous tender of rent and exercise of the option. This tender, if valid, could have extinguished the rental obligation and transformed the parties’ relationship from lessor-lessee to vendor-vendee, making the order for rescission and surrender of possession legally erroneous. The opinion does not analyze whether the plaintiff’s refusal of the tender was justified or in bad faith.

Ultimately, the ruling establishes a perilously high bar for vacating a default judgment, potentially undermining the policy favoring the resolution of cases on their merits. While trial court discretion is broad, it is not absolute and must be exercised wisely to serve the ends of justice. Here, the defendant demonstrated a concerted, albeit procedurally imperfect, effort to present a defense that went to the heart of the contract’s terms. The Court’s affirmation without deeper scrutiny of the substantive defense allegations risks endorsing a forfeiture based on a procedural default in a case involving significant property rights. The concurrence of the full court suggests a rigid application of procedural rules, overshadowing the equitable considerations inherent in Aequitas Sequitur Legem.